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ARTICLES
LEGISLATIVELY REVISING KELO V. CITY OF NEW




In providing that private property may not be taken for "public use" without just
compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government officials from
compelling citizens to relinquish their property for something other than a "public use."
However, the United States Supreme Court has long defined "public use"
expansively-so expansively that the federal courts do not meaningfully review
government officials' justifications for invoking eminent domain.' Many state courts
have also treated government officials' invocations of eminent domain with nearly
complete deference. 2 In general, the United States Supreme Court has been somewhat
sensitive to traditional property rights. Indeed, it has increasingly protected such rights
by expanding the definition of a "taking" 3 and thereby enlarging the obligation to
proffer "just compensation." Nevertheless, commentators from various perspectives
have severely criticized the Supreme Court's refusal to constrain government's use of
the takings power.
4
.Associate Dean, Professor, and Herbert Hannoch Scholar, Rutgers Law School (Newark). I gratefully
acknowledge the assistance of the Dean's Research Fund in completing this project. I thank my colleagues
who attended the Rutgers faculty colloquium session at which I presented a draft of this paper for their
comments.
1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 242 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (1986) ("[M]ost observers today think the public use limitation is a dead
letter.").
2. 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[3] (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2002). Some states,
however, have been more aggressive, as Merrill found in his 1986 study. Merill, supra note 1, at 96
(reporting that in all federal cases in which parties challenged a taking as one not for "public use," the
government prevailed, whereas in 16.2% of state appellate cases the court found that the taking did not serve a
"public use").
3. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1030-31 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
305 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 867-68 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438-39 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Brief for the NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 30, Kelo v. City of
New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2811057; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 161-62 (1985); STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF
POWER: HOW THE GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT DOMAIN (2004); Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsch, Making
Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207 passim (2004). See generally Merrill, supra note 1; DANA
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In Kelo v. City of New London,5 the Court reconsidered its deferential approach in
the context of local officials' use of eminent domain in conjunction with economic
development efforts. 6  In recent years, localities have sought to pursue economic
revitalization plans, often relying upon eminent domain to acquire land needed for
redevelopment projects. The Court not only rejected the challenge to New London's
invocation of eminent domain to acquire land for a major redevelopment project but
crafted an opinion quite deferential to governmental authorities. Indeed, the type of
review that the opinion embraces resembles the extremely deferential "rational basis"
review the Court employs in examining equal protection and due process challenges to
government actions that involve neither "suspect classifications" nor "fundamental
rights." 7 Such a reaction is hardly surprising because the inquiry raises similar issues
about the relative roles of judges and democratically-elected officials in determining the
government's role in society, and therefore the purposes government can legitimately
pursue.8 It is not clear, however, whether the Court, if left to its own devices, would
ultimately produce a jurisprudence that resembles "rational basis" review or some more
robust form of review instead. Justice Kennedy's special concurrence suggests some
concerns that might lead him to invalidate certain takings and to engage in more than
perfunctory review of officials' determinations that a taking qualifies as a 
"public use." 9
Reaction to the Court's decision has been swift and sharp. Opinion polls have
shown a public sharply critical of the decision.10  Many states have enacted or are
considering legislation restricting the use of eminent domain for economic
revitalization.I1  Several states have created commissions to study the use of eminent
domain for economic redevelopment. Indeed, legislation restricting the use of eminent
domain for economic development has even been considered in Connecticut, the state
from which Kelo arose. 12  On the federal level, the United States House of
Representatives almost immediately passed both a resolution of disapproval and an
BERLINER, INST. FOR JUSTICE, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE-YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT
ExAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/
ED.report.pdf.
5. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
6. States have long allowed the use of eminent domain to further economic development, particularly to
enable private parties to fully develop the states' natural resources. Id. at 2663 n.8; I NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN, supra note 2, §§ 1.22[7]-[8]; 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 7.03[l], 7.03[2][c],
7.03[1 0][c]. However, these uses often involve easements rather than acquisition of title to property for
transfer to another.
7. Rational basis review is described in JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 11.4 at 387-90, § 14.3 at 601 (5th ed. 1995); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 489 (2004).
8. Merrill, supra note 1, at 66-68; 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.4 (3d
ed. 2000).
9. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10. Opinion polls indicate that the public believes, in overwhelming numbers, that the exercise of
eminent domain should be constrained more significantly than the Court constrained such powers in Kelo.
Castle Coalition, The Polls Are In: Americans Overwhelmingly Oppose Use of Eminent Domain for Private
Gain, http://www.castlecoalition.org/resources/kelo-polls.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
11. John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at Al;
Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at A l; Maura
Kelly Lannan, Many States See a Push to Limit Property Seizures, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, July 20, 2005, at
7.
12. See Stacey Stowe, On Eminent Domain, Many Shifting Stances, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at B3.
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appropriations rider prohibiting the use of funds to enforce the decision. 13 Both the
House and the Senate have introduced legislation to reverse Kelo. Indeed, the decision
seems to have united members of Congress from across the political spectrum,
including, for example, conservative former Republican House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay and liberal Democrat Representatives John Conyers and Barney Frank. 
14
The severity of the reaction is particularly striking because the Court upheld the
challenged government action. (Moreover, in doing so, the Kelo majority did not even
depart from well-established precedent.) Virtually all Supreme Court constitutional
decisions that have provoked widespread outrage, such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States 15 and the series of cases invalidating New Deal legislation in
1935 and 1936; Brown v. Board of Education16 and subsequent school desegregation
cases; Engel v. Vitale, 17 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 18 and
subsequent school prayer cases; Miranda v. Arizona1 9 and other Warren Court criminal
procedure rulings; Roe v. Wade;2 0 Furman v. Georgia;2 1 and Texas v. Johnson,2 2 for
example, involve invalidation of government action. Even more remarkably, the
governmental bodies that most benefit from the discretion that Kelo reaffirmed are not
federal agencies, but state and, particularly, local governments-theoretically the
political jurisdictions most responsive to the citizenry.
I will not dwell upon the merits of the Kelo decision. I wish to consider whether
Congress can constrain state and local officials' reliance on eminent domain. Phrased
more provocatively, my query is whether Congress can legislatively overrule, or at least
revise, the conception of the "public use" requirement embodied in Kelo and constrain
the discretion to which states and localities seem entitled under the decision. Grappling
with the question will involve assessing the implications of the Court's recent judicial
supremacy and federalism jurisprudence. 23
Part I of this paper will summarize Kelo and outline the congressional reaction to
the decision. Part I will explore the potential bases for congressional action, focusing
largely on Congress' powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Commerce Clause, and the Spending Clause. I will conclude that broad action of the
13. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. H5592-93 (2005); H.R. Res. 3058, 109th Cong.,
amend. 427, 109 CONG. REC. H5512-13, H5504-06 (2005). The vote in favor of the resolution was 365-33.
151 CONG. REC. H5593, H5593 (2005).
14. 151 CONG. REC. H5578 (2005) (statement of Rep. Conyers); id. at H5580 (statement of Rep. Delay);
id. at H5580-81 (statement of Rep. Frank).
15. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
18. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
23. This question will require many, including virtually all of the Justices, and perhaps a sizable number
of Senators and Representatives, to grapple with contradictory impulses. The Justices who dissented in Kelo
and seek rigorous judicial review of the takings power have more generally sought to constrain federal powers
over the states and have zealously guarded the Court's role as the preeminent interpreter of the Constitution.
On the other side, all but one of the Justices that formed the Kelo majority have favored an expansive view of
federal power that affords Congress greater leeway to impose limitations upon the states based on Congress'
own independent conception of particular constitutional provisions.
2006]
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kind Congress has begun to consider, which seeks to prohibit use of eminent domain for
economic redevelopment, will fall victim to the principles of federalism and judicial
supremacy. However, Congress could seek to target specific problems surrounding the
use of eminent domain for economic development, and indeed the use of eminent
domain more generally, and the Court may well uphold such targeted approaches.
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. Kelo v. City of New London
By 1998, after decades of economic decline, designation by a state agency as a
"distressed municipality," and the closure of a military installation in the Fort Trumbull
section of the City, New London's unemployment rate had risen to nearly twice the
State average and its population had reached its lowest level since 1920. 24 Pfizer Inc.,
an international pharmaceutical company, announced plans to build a major facility
adjacent to Fort Trumbull. 5 New London officials, with the assistance of the New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private non-profit entity, crafted a
redevelopment plan focused on ninety acres in Fort Trumbull. 6 They designed the
project to capitalize on the economic activity Pfizer's facility would attract.27 Officials
anticipated that the redevelopment would create jobs, generate tax revenue, make the
city aesthetically more appealing, and create recreational opportunities. 28 The mixed-
use development would include a waterfront conference hotel anchoring a cluster of
restaurants and shops.29 It would also include a marina, new homes, a museum, and
office space. 30 The city council authorized submission of the plan to state authorities,
which, after evaluating six alternative proposals, approved it.
3 1
Though most of the land was purchased from willing sellers, Susette Kelo and eight
local landowners refused to sell their property, and the City sought to acquire their
property by eminent domain. 32 By statute, the State of Connecticut declared that the
taking of land, even developed land, as part of an economic development project
qualified as a taking for a "public use." 33 Kelo and the other landowners sought to
prevent the City from invoking eminent domain, arguing that taking property to further
local economic development did not qualify as a "public use." 34  The trial court
enjoined some of the proposed takings and permitted others. 35  The Connecticut
24. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
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Supreme Court held all of the proposed takings constitutionally permissible.
36
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 37  Justice Stevens, writing for the
Court, noted that a city could not use eminent domain, consistent with the Fifth
Amendment, to take land in order to confer a private benefit on a particular private
party, nor could a locality use a public purpose as a pretext for such a coerced transfer
of property for private gain. 38 However, the majority noted, the record contained no
evidence of such an illicit purpose, and, indeed, city officials had not adopted the
development plan to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.
39
Though eminent domain could be used to acquire land for use by the general
public, Justice Stevens observed, New London was not planning to open all of the
condemned land for the general public's use, either through public ownership or
transfer of the property to private entities operating public accommodations (i.e.,
businesses open to all for a fee).4 ° Justice Stevens noted that the Court had long
rejected a narrow definition of the term "public use" that would permit the use of
eminent domain only when the government would make the acquired land available to
the general public. 4' Rather, he explained, the validity of the City's invocation of its
eminent domain power turned on whether its development plan served a "public
purpose," a concept that has traditionally been defined "broadly" and reflects the
Court's "longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments" with respect to such
matters. 
42
In the majority's view, eminent domain precedent recognizes that society's needs
have evolved over time and may vary geographically. The Court has "wisely eschewed
rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power."
' 43
While New London's elected officials did not confront blight, as did the defendants
in Berman v. Parker,44 their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation merited deference. The majority refused to
adopt plaintiffs' proposed bright-line rule that would define "public use" to exclude
economic development efforts. Justice Stevens explained that "[p]romoting economic
development is a traditional and long accepted function of government" 45 and that the
Court could draw no principled distinction between economic development and other
uses recognized as "public" in Berman, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
4 6
36. Id. at 2660-61.
37. Amici curae filed over forty briefs in the case; of these, twenty-five supported the petitioners'
argument. Wikipedia, Kelo v. City of New London, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelo v. New London (last
visited July 6, 2006).
38. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
39. Id. at 2661-62.
40. Id. at 2662.
41. Id. at 2662-63.
42. Id. at 2663.
43. Id. at 2664.
44. 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (upholding use of eminent domain to acquire land to revitalize a blighted
area).
45. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
46. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding Hawaii's use of eminent domain to redistribute land and thus reduce
the concentration in land ownership in the state).
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,47 and other precedents. Any blurring of the boundary
between takings for public and private purposes was of no concern, and indeed "the
government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties."
48
Justice Stevens added: "[t]he public end may be as well served through an agency of
private enterprise than through a department of government."
49
The majority also refused to hold that the "public use" requirement required
government officials to establish a proposed redevelopment project's expected
economic benefits to a "reasonable certainty." 50 Quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, Justice Stevens explained that "empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-
no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socio-economic legislation-are
not to be carried on in the federal courts." 51 Such a rule would create a significant and
unwarranted impediment to comprehensive redevelopment efforts.
52
In the final paragraph of its opinion, the majority acknowledged both the hardships
that condemnations may entail even when property owners receive adequate
compensation and the importance of questions that had been raised about the fairness of
the measure of "just compensation."' 5 3  It also emphasized each state's freedom to
impose greater restrictions on the power of eminent domain.54 The Court did not
suggest that Congress had any role to play in addressing states' and localities' potential
abuses of eminent domain. Finally, the Court acknowledged that "the necessity and
wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly
matters of legitimate public debate."
' 55
Justice Kennedy, writing separately, asserted that a court "applying a rational basis
review" to determine whether a taking satisfied the "public use" requirement should
invalidate any taking that, "by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private
party with only incidental or pretextual public benefits." 56  He cited Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 57 and Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,5 8 two equal
protection cases, as examples of cases in which the Supreme Court had found that a
governmental action failed "rational basis" review precisely because the challenged
action was primarily intended to disadvantage certain private parties. 59  Justice
Kennedy admonished courts confronting a plausible claim of impermissible favoritism
to treat the claim seriously and carefully review the record. In Kelo, he explained, the
trial court had conducted just such a serious inquiry. The trial court engaged in a
47. 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (upholding a federal statute allowing an applicant for pesticide approval to rely
on data submitted by a prior applicant so long as it paid "just compensation" for the data).
48. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666.
49. Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 34).
50. Id. at 2667.
51. Id. at (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority, 467 U.S. at 242).
52. Id. at 2667-68.
53. Id. at 2668.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
57. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
58. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
59. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id.
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"careful and extensive" inquiry regarding whether the development plan primarily
benefited the developer, Pfizer, and the businesses that would relocate in the area. The
court, for example, heard testimony from government officials and corporate officers
and reviewed documentary evidence of communications between the parties.
6 1
Justice Kennedy noted that a "more stringent" review might be appropriate for
categories of takings involving "private transfers in which the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties" is particularly acute. 62  He refused to
speculate about categories of cases that might warrant more intense judicial scrutiny.
However, he underscored several aspects of Kelo that made departure from the
deferential BermanlMidkiff standard of review inappropriate. First, the taking occurred
in the context of a comprehensive development plan addressing "a serious city-wide
depression.",63 Second, the projected economic benefits were more than de minimis.
6 4
Third, city officials did not know the identities of most of the private beneficiaries when
they formulated their redevelopment plan.65 Fourth, the city had complied with
elaborate procedural requirements that, moreover, facilitate judicial review. 66
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissenters, acknowledged that "in certain
circumstances and to meet certain exigencies," the Court had held the taking of property
destined for a private use satisfied the "public use" requirement. 6 7  However, she
viewed the majority's deferential approach, which in her opinion permitted any taking
of property for private use so long as the new use generated some benefit to the public,
as a complete abdication of the judiciary's role in scrutinizing government officials'
justifications for taking private property. Nearly any lawful use of private property
arguably generates some incidental benefit to the public. 68 The genesis of this failure to
enforce the "public use" requirement lay in Berman and Midkiff where the Court had
erred in equating the concept of "public use," the limitation on the state's invocation of
eminent domain, with that of "the police power," a much broader concept. 69
Justice O'Connor criticized both the majority and Justice Kennedy for failing to
give the lower courts any meaningful direction in seeking to identify impermissible
takings designed to bestow a private benefit. As she observed, "the trouble with
economic takings is that private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition,
merged and mutually reinforcing." Moreover, she said, the majority's pretext test
turned on the motives of state officials, which she considered a problematic basis for
constitutional adjudication. She queried: "If it is true that incidental public benefits
from new private use are enough to ensure the 'public purpose' in a taking, why should
61. Id. at 2669-70.
62. Id. at 2670.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2670.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2673, 2675.
69. Id. at 2675; accord id. at 2683-84, 2685-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
distinguished Berman and Midkifffrom the case before the Court, explaining that the takings in those cases
targeted properties that were inflicting affirmative harm, and, thus, the takings themselves had served to
eliminate that harm. Id. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the
first place?"
7 1
Justice Thomas added his own dissent. Arguing that the Court should reconsider
its precedents, he undertook a textual analysis of the Takings Clause and a historical
examination of understanding of the term "public use." 72 He would have held that
government entities could invoke the power of eminent domain only to acquire property
that would be held by the government or made accessible to the general public as of
right.73 He also complained that deference to public officials' determinations that
proposed uses qualify as "public uses" was both inappropriate and inconsistent with the
Court's non-deferential review of government actions threatening other Bill of Rights
protections. 74 He pointedly noted that poor and minority communities would be those
most likely to suffer displacement under the majority's ruling-first, land in such
communities is more often underutilized; second, such communities possess the least
political power. 75
B. The Congressional Response
As noted above, congressional reaction was swift. The House of Representatives
almost immediately adopted a resolution disapproving the decision. Two
representatives successfully added a rider, designed to prohibit federal funds to enforce
the Kelo judgment, to the fiscal year 2006 appropriations bill covering the Departments
of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development. Senators and
Representatives introduced companion bills seeking to limit federal involvement in
economic development projects that were furthered by the use of eminent domain. In
November, the House passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005.
The House Resolution states that the majority opinion in Kelo "renders the public
use provision in the Takings Clause of the fifth amendment [sic] without meaning," and
"justifies the forfeiture of a person's private property through eminent domain for the
sole benefit of another private person." 76 The resolution asserts that the dissenting
opinion affirms the principle that the eminent domain power may be employed only to
"compel an individual to forfeit her property for the public's use, but not for the benefit
of another private person." 77 Quoting the dissent, it declares that beneficiaries of the
decision are "likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in
the political process, including large corporations and development firms." 78  The
resolution declares that "all levels of government have a Constitutional responsibility
and a moral obligation to... defend property... rights" and that such a duty requires
each level of government to "only execute the power of eminent domain for those
71. Id. at 2675-76.
72. Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2680-82.
74. Id. at 2684-85.
75. Id. at 2686-87. He reviewed the history of local economic redevelopment, including the Urban
Renewal program, to show that such efforts predominantly displaced minority and poor communities. Id.
76. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong., pmbl. (2005).
77. Id. (quoting Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
78. Id. (quoting Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
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purposes that serve the public good." 79 The resolution then specifically disapproves of
the majority's opinion and explicitly endorses the dissenting opinion. 
80
The resolution expresses the sense of the House that state and local governments
use eminent domain only for purposes that serve the public good, and pay just
compensation when they do-any taking that fails to satisfy those requirements
"constitutes an abuse of government power and an usurpation of' individual property
rights.81 The resolution further declares that eminent domain should never be used to
advantage one party over another. It urges state and local governments to abstain from
using Kelo "as justification to abuse the power of eminent domain" and expressly
"reserves the right to address through legislation any abuses of eminent domain by State
and local government" that Kelo occasions.
82
Representatives Scott Garrett and Mark R. Kennedy, pursing a separate legislative
initiative, successfully proposed a rider to the fiscal year 2006 appropriations bill
covering the Departments of Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban
Development. 83 The rider bans expenditure of any funds to enforce the judgment of the
Court in Kelo.84 Garrett explained that "if a private developer is going to push someone
off their land, out of their house, and destroy that house or small business, then he
should foot the bill for any infrastructure that he is going to build." 85 Thus the rider is
designed to "ensure that the Federal Government does not contribute in any way
financially" to such projects. 
86
Representative Dennis Rehberg and Senator John Cornyn respectively introduced
the companion House and Senate bills to overturn Kelo, entitled the "Protection of
Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005." 87  The bills set forth
findings that largely criticize the majority's opinion and endorse the dissenters' views.
The bills do not explicitly invoke any particular enumerated congressional power. The
bills provide that eminent domain may be used to acquire property only for "public use"
and specify that the term "public use" shall not be construed to include economic
development. 88 The drafters have left the term "economic development" undefined.
As Justice Stevens noted in Kelo, a variety of takings, such as those that further
exploitation of a state's natural resources, might be considered takings in aid of
79. Id. § 2(A).
80. Id. § I(A)-(B).
81. Id. § 2(C).
82. Id. § 2(E)-(F).
83. 151 CONG. REC. H5483, H5505 (2005) (H. Amend. 427 to H.R. 3058, 109th Cong. by Rep. Scott
Gamett).
84. Id. An amendment to reduce the funding of the Supreme Court in reaction to Kelo, H. Amend. 427,
however, was overwhelmingly defeated 374-42. 151 CONG. REC. at H5504-05.
85. 151 CONG. REC. at H5505 (Rep. Garrett).
86. Id. In his view, "[tihe practical effect of this will mean that we will prohibit Federal dollars from
going out to be used for support purposes, infrastructure and the like, so that a private developer will benefit
from the loss of people's homes." Id. It would mean that "a bus stop will not be built on what was once [the]
home [of someone whose property was taken by eminent domain] in order that a commercial building can be
built there instead." Id. Moreover, it would "prohibit Federal dollars from building a new entrance ramp or
an exit ramp in partnership with that developer so that that developer can build a strip mall there instead." Id.
The rider, of course, would limit federal funding only for the upcoming fiscal year. Id. at 5483.
87. Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005, H.R. 3083, 109th Cong.
(2005); Protection of Homes, Small Business, and Private Property Act of 2005; S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005).
88. H.R. 3083 § 3(b); S. 1313 § 3(b).
20061
Journal of Legislation
economic development. 89 Given the bills' context, however, courts might well construe
any resulting legislation as limited to economic revitalization plans for non-blighted
areas of the type at issue in Kelo. 90 The Act applies to "all exercises of eminent domain
power by the Federal Government; and all exercises of eminent domain power by State
and local government through the use of Federal funds." 91 The statute neither explicitly
provides a right of action against the federal government nor abrogates state sovereign
immunity. The bills have been referred to committee.
92
The Private Property Protection Act of 200593 is far more robust than the
legislation discussed above. It precludes states and their subdivisions from using
eminent domain for economic development during any year in which they receive
federal economic development funds. 94  Moreover, any violation of the provision
subjects the offending state or political subdivision to a two-year period of ineligibility
for federal economic development funds (unless the entity can cure the violation). 95
The statute defines an economic development taking as "conveying or leasing . . .
property [of] one private person or entity to another private person or entity for
commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base,
employment, or general economic health," with certain exceptions. 96 The bill grants a
right of action to landowners who believe their property has been taken in violation of
the statute and expressly waives state immunity to such lawsuits. 97 The legislation also
provides specific protection for religious and non-profit institutions, specifying that no
state or subdivision shall use eminent domain with respect to the property of a religious
or non-profit institution "by reason of the nonprofit or tax-exempt status of such
organization, or any quality related thereto" on pain of losing eligibility to receive
federal economic development funds for two years. 98 In explaining Congress' authority
to enact such legislation, the proponents of the measure cited Congress' Spending
Clause power, as well as its Commerce Clause power and its power to enforce the
89. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 n.8 (2005).
90. Many courts have accepted removal of blight as a "public use" that could justify condemnation;
indeed, Justice O'Connor does so herself. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75. However, there has been some
criticism about the validity of blight determinations. Interpreting the statute to allow removal of blight might
require federal agencies funding projects (and perhaps federal courts adjudicating challenges to the funding of
projects) to review "blight" determinations. BERLINER, supra note 4, at 5; GREENHUT, supra note 4, at 7-9.
91. H.R. 3083 § 3(c); S. 1313 § 3(c)(1-2).
92. At least two other bills have been introduced. Strengthening the Ownership of Private Property Act
of 2005, H.R. 3405, 109th Cong. (2005); Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3135, 109th
Cong. (2005).
93. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
94. Id. § 2. The legislation also provides that the federal government shall not exercise eminent domain
for economic development purposes. Id. § 3.
95. Id. § 2(b)-(c). To cure the violation, the entity must return all real property acquired in violation of
the prohibition and replace or repair any property damaged as a result of the violation. Id. § 2(c).
96. Id. § 8(I). The exceptions include conveyance to a common carrier for use as a road or other means
of public transportation; or for use as an aqueduct, flood control facility, or pipeline. Id. § 8(l)(A)(i-iv).
Exceptions are also provided for removing harmful uses of land that cause an immediate threat to public
health and safety, leasing property to a private person that owns an incidental part of a public building,
acquiring abandoned property, clearing defective titles, and acquiring property for use of a public facility. Id.
§ 8(l)(B-F).
97. Id. § 4(a).
98. Id. § 13(a)-(b).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 99
The various legislative proposals focus on the use of eminent domain by the federal
government and the use of federal funds to support state and local projects made
possible by those governments' use of their powers of eminent domain. The limitations
on the federal governments' use of eminent domain will likely prove insubstantial-few
federal projects are likely to be considered "economic development project[s]." 10 0 The
limitation on federal funding could prove more significant, particularly the far-reaching
provisions of the House-approved Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005.101
Even the broadest proposals restricting state and local use of eminent domain seem
largely incongruent with Congress' real concerns. In particular, Congress views the
Court as providing inadequate protection for property rights. 102 Indeed, in Congress'
view, the Court's ruling reflects a fundamentally flawed conception of citizens' rights
under the Fifth Amendment. In addition, members of Congress expressed concern that
the ruling would harm minorities, the poor, and the politically powerless. 103  Such
concerns are not fully addressed by limiting the federal government's use of eminent
domain nor by limiting federal funding of state and local projects. State and local
authorities would remain free to take property in circumstances where individuals'
property rights, at least as Congress conceptualized them, are violated. Granted,
however, as a practical matter, reliance on federal economic development funds may be
so extensive that states and localities would have little choice but to abandon the use of
eminent domain for economic development purposes.
C. Congressional Options
Congress could seek to address state and local use of eminent domain in several
ways. It could: 1) specify the measure of compensation due as a result of a "taking"; 2)
establish procedures or disclosure requirements for states and localities invoking
eminent domain; 3) create certain rebuttable presumptions, identifying circumstances in
which courts should presume a taking is for private use, and thus impermissible, absent
evidence to the contrary; or 4) proscribe the use of eminent domain in certain
99. H.R. Rep. 109-262, pt. 1, at 19 (2005); H.R. REP. No. 109-262., pt. 2, at 17 (2005).
100. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). Two major works detailing the use of
eminent domain to further economic development do not identify any significant federal economic
development projects, much less ones effectuated by the federal government's invocation of its own eminent
domain powers. See BERLINER, supra note 4; GREENHUT, supra note 4.
101. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). The significance of the Garrett-Kennedy Rider or the Rehberg-
Comyn proposal are difficult to assess, in part because the breadth of the prohibition is unclear. The
proposals may prohibit use of federal funds only to pay for property acquired by eminent domain for
economic development purposes but allow federal funding of segregable aspects of the redevelopment
project. Alternatively, the proposed provisions might preclude all federal financial assistance to a project that
uses land improperly acquired by a state or local use of eminent domain. More broadly still, the proposals
might ban federal funding for anything related to a project sited in whole or in part on land acquired from an
unwilling landowner for economic development purposes (such as providing transportation funds for a mass
transit station on or near the site of an offending project).
102. See, e.g., H.R. 3135, 109th Cong. (2005). The concerns motivating this legislation are clearly a
desire to vindicate the right to property, which members of Congress believe that the Constitution protects.
151 CONG. REC. H5505 (2005) ("[P]roperty rights are fundamental freedom ... Congress must take action to
protect property owners in the aftermath of this flawed decision.").
103. 151 CONG. REC. H5505 (2005).
2006]
Journal of Legislation
circumstances. I will discuss the first option at length and the remainder more briefly.
The measure of "just compensation" may not adequately compensate property
owners for their losses and, accordingly, may lead government officials to overuse
eminent domain. Ordinarily, when the government invokes eminent domain, it has the
right to acquire the property at market value. 104 It need not compensate owners for the
increase in value expected as a result of the government project, 105 nor need it
compensate individuals for financial losses and hardships not recognized by the
market. 106  Thus, the courts ordinarily do not require the government to compensate
business owners for the loss of good will or the losses from business interruption caused
by the need to relocate. Nor do the courts require the government to compensate
property owners for the sentimental or subjective value of their property, the
inconvenience of moving, or the cost of finding a comparable property. 107 Indeed, such
uncompensated costs may be particularly pronounced for homeowners and businesses
displaced from poorer neighborhoods. 108
The measure of "just compensation" has importance because the Taking Clause's
"just compensation" requirement provides a financial constraint on the use of eminent
domain. A government project furthered by the use of eminent domain must be more
valuable than the compensation due in order for the use of eminent domain to make
economic sense. If the measure of "just compensation" understates a taking's full social
cost, relieving the government from paying some of the costs attendant its taking, the
government will sometimes engage in the practice even when a project's real social
costs exceed its benefits. 109  A measure of compensation that accurately reflects a
taking's true cost would force governments to properly balance public needs against the
harm to individuals. 110 At the same time, of course, imposing unrealistically high costs
104. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943); 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, §
12.02.
105. Miller, 317 U.S. at 375; 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 8.07 ("The general rule
forbids consideration of the effect of the proposed project upon the value of the property taken."); see also 4
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 12.02[1]; id. § 12B.17[l].
106. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946); EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 183; 4
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 12.01 (noting that there is no account of sentimental value);
id. § 12.04[2]; id. § 13.14; Merrill, supra note 1, at 82-83; W. Harold Bigham, "'Fair Market Value, " "Just
Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REv. 63, 66 (1971); Note,
Condemnations, Implicit Benefits, and Collective Losses: Achieving Just Compensation Through
"Community," 107 HARV. L. REv. 696, 696, 713 n. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Achieving Just Compensation].
107. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 377-78.
108. 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 8.22; Achieving Just Compensation, supra note
106, at 696.
109. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 281 n.7,
287-88. Farber suggests, however, that public-spirited legislators would take into account the benefits and
costs of takings even if no compensation is required, and, in most circumstances, will offer compensation to
the dispossessed. Id. at 287-88. As I suggest in discussing the political context of local takings, local
officials may not seriously weigh the costs of eminent domain on those displaced without a financial incentive
to do so. Supra text accompanying notes 209-216, 285-289. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 364-65 (1995) (describing the need for financial
incentives to restrain government decision-making in the regulatory takings context).
110. Placing limitations on damages and valuation rules provides one means to protect constitutional
rights. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (setting forth guideposts limiting size of
punitive damages awards); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (limiting presumed
damages in certain defamation cases). The constitutional right was vindicated in both the defamation and
punitive damages contexts by limiting state damage awards rather than requiring larger awards than those
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would improperly inhibit the use of eminent domain, and indeed could, if severe
enough, preclude governments from using such authority altogether."III
Congress might establish minimum requirements for just compensation when a
locality acquires property for transfer to third parties in connection with its
redevelopment efforts. 112  In particular, Congress could reasonably conclude that
private developers should not receive all of the surplus generated by the redevelopment
project, but rather, that displaced landowners should share the surplus. 113 Thus, for
purposes of determining "just compensation" in circumstances involving economic
redevelopment takings, the valuation of the land might focus on the value of the
property to be condemned in light of the prospect that the redevelopment project will be
completed. Congress might also require that just compensation for such takings take
into account the inconvenience a reasonable person would suffer in relocating. 114 Such
awards will make the cost of the project more representative of the project's true social
costs, while relieving individuals of financial burdens that society as a whole should
shoulder. 115 Moreover, it may ameliorate some of the harsh effects of redevelopment
efforts on residents of neighborhoods targeted for redevelopment, in effect providing
them sufficient compensation to allow them to secure comparable property. 
116
In addition, the projects constructed for economic development purposes differ
from many traditional government projects sited on land acquired by eminent domain.
Profit-making entities that own economic development projects expect to make a profit
on the projects constructed, unlike most government projects, which profit-making
entities do not own. Some might justify requiring citizens to subsidize projects, by
receiving compensation that does not fully cover the inconvenience caused by eminent
domain, as a sacrifice reasonably demanded of citizens to support non-profit-making
government operations. (Such operations may be non-profit-making precisely because
the nature of the good or service precludes the market from producing the optimal
amount of such good or service.) However, it seems unreasonable to demand such
sacrifice for the benefit of a profit-making enterprise. Profit-making enterprises should
be expected to cover the costs of producing the goods and services they offer, including
the cost of displacing pre-existing landowners.
The remaining options for congressional action can be discussed more briefly.
provided by the state.
111. United States v. One Parcel of Land, 131 F. Supp. 443, 445-46 (D.D.C. 1955). In other words,
compensation must be just to the condemnor as well as the condemnee. 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN,
supra note 2, § 8.0[1].
112. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973).
113. Merrill, supra note 1, at 84-85 (discussing surplus); EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 162-66, 173-74.
States have required payments of special damages and premiums for private and municipal corporations to
exercise the power to condemn. 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 8.06[l]; see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 184 (discussing use of bonuses in England).
114. 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 12.01[3]. Setting forth standards for determining
the amount government bodies must pay for a "taking" is not an exclusively judicial function. For example,
in some states valuation of property taken by eminent domain is considered a judicial issue. Nevertheless,
legislatures have the power to require that condemners pay more than minimum compensation. Id. § 8.22[1].
115. The Supreme Court has observed that the Takings Clause ensures that particular individuals do not
bear a burden that the public should share more broadly. See Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 332 (2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24
(1978) (relying on the principle in deciding whether a compensable taking has indeed occurred).
116. But see United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 514 (1979).
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Congress could seek to ensure that eminent domain decisions are made in a transparent
and politically-accountable manner-the second option listed at the start of this section.
To promote transparency and political accountability, Congress might require that local
officials compile a record and set forth their justifications for concluding that a project
will benefit the public as well as a private developer. Perhaps it can also require that the
politically-accountable officials make the decision. Indeed, in Kelo, Justice Kennedy
noted the importance of procedures for determining whether a redevelopment plan
served a public purpose. 117  He noted that Connecticut's procedures ensured the
compilation of a record that would facilitate judicial review. 
11 8
As a third option, Congress might seek to identify particular circumstances in
which a taking is especially likely to have an impermissible private purpose. For
example, local governments' attempts to condemn extremely small parcels unrelated to
any larger redevelopment plan might warrant heightened scrutiny. Congress might
establish a presumption that a taking has a prohibited private purpose when one private
company will gain possession of all of the land taken by eminent domain, particularly
when that enterprise provides a large part of the applicable jurisdiction's employment
opportunities or tax revenues. Concerns about local officials' motives might justify
reversing the customary presumption of validity applicable to invocations of eminent
domain. For example, Congress might mandate heightened judicial scrutiny when
government officials seek to condemn tax-exempt property. Such adverse presumptions
would be rebuttable. 
119
A rebuttable presumption could perhaps address the concerns frequently expressed
about the particularly damaging impact economic development condemnations have on
racial and ethnic minorities. 12 For example, Congress could establish a rebuttable
presumption that requires invalidation of economic redevelopment projects that
disproportionately affect racial and ethnic minorities, the elderly, or the poor, unless
local officials make some heightened showing of necessity for the project. However,
given that a large percentage of redevelopment efforts presumably have a
disproportionate impact on such groups, such a rule might make virtually all urban
economic development projects presumptively illegal. Such an extensive rebuttable
presumption might be held to unduly infringe upon the traditional local powers
recognized in Kelo.
Congress could embrace a fourth option, precluding states and localities from using
eminent domain altogether in certain limited circumstances. For example, Congress
could preclude the use of eminent domain to acquire land on which to build a stadium
primarily for use by a professional sports team. Alternatively, Congress might preclude
the use of eminent domain in connection with an economic development project when
the land used for the project is solely or predominantly that of a non-profit institution.
117. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2670 (2005).
118. Id.
119. Calling local officials to testify about their motives can itself be considered an expression of
disrespect. Indeed, federal courts seek to avoid such inquiries even when reviewing the actions of unelected
federal administrative officials. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971);
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26,
44 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 148-50.
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Such a rule would target the concern that local officials employ eminent domain to
replace tax-exempt institutions with taxable ones. Pursuing the fourth option involves
placing the greatest restrictions on state and local powers and thus carries the greatest
risk of exceeding congressional power.
I do not necessarily suggest that any particular idea set forth above merits adoption.
However, the discussion above provides a range of options that Congress might
consider. Perhaps more importantly, these options provide a useful context for
assessing the scope of Congress' powers to restrict states and localities' use of eminent
domain.
III. Congress' Powers Regarding State and Local Use of Eminent Domain
Legislation restricting state and local use of eminent domain would most likely be
premised on one of three Constitutional provisions: the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the Spending Clause. 12 1  The
Court's recent federalism jurisprudence has cabined both the Enforcement Clause
power and the Commerce Clause power. While no federalism challenge to Congress'
invocation of the Spending Clause has succeeded in the past sixty-five years, the Court
has indicated that federalism principles limit Congress' power to condition federal aid
to states. 122 I will discuss each of the three sources of potential congressional power in
turn.
A. The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress often assumes a role in enforcing constitutional rights. Sometimes it even
effectively defines the substantive scope of a constitutional right by enacting legislation
reflecting its conception of the right. 123 Congress may provide individuals greater legal
protection from the federal government than governing judicial doctrine requires; for
example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (the successor to Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968) 124 includes provisions protecting citizens against
wiretapping that exceed the constitutional requirements established by the federal
courts. 125
121. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. I (Spending Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (Enforcement Clause). The Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 18 supplements these powers.
122. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981).
123. For a more extended development of this theme, see Bemard W. Bell, Marbury v. Madison and the
Madisonian Vision, 72 GEO WASH. L. REV. 197, 209-17 (2003) [hereinafter Bell, The Madisonian Vision].
124. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
125. Similarly, Congress has by statute granted military personnel rights to the free exercise of religion,
which are greater than the rights required by the courts as a constitutional matter. For example, 10 U.S.C. §
3073 and 10 U.S.C. § 774(a)-(b), provide rights that, according to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
509-10 (1986), Congress need not provide. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2121-22 (2005).
Republican efforts in the mid-1990s to require compensation when federal regulation reduced the value of
property sought to expand the rights of individuals beyond the constitutional minimum recognized by the
courts. E.g., Private Property Owners Bill of Rights, H.R. 790, 104th Cong. § 8 (1995); see William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
782, 879 (1995) (listing legislative proposals mandating compensation when regulation diminishes property
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Congress may also expand upon judicially declared constitutional rights by
granting citizens expanded rights 'against states and their subdivisions. It may do so
pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers, like the power to regulate
interstate commerce. 126 However, Congress cannot expand upon constitutional rights
when there is a countervailing constitutional restraint, 12 7 such as the federalism
doctrines. Congress possesses enhanced powers under the Fourteenth Amendment,
which prohibits the states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law" and from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."' 128 The Amendment's Enforcement Clause confers
upon Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, even when federalism
doctrines would ordinarily bar such actions. 129 As the Supreme Court has explained,
the Civil War Amendments were specifically designed to expand federal power andS 130
intrude upon state sovereignty. However, no Civil War Amendment completely
abrogates certain core federalism principles. 131
In the modem era, the scope of congressional power under the Enforcement Clause
has been a matter of intense debate. Three cases in the 1960s and 1970s show the
Court's willingness to allow Congress a significant role in the defining constitutional
rights. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 132 the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of
1965,133 finding that the statute lay within the powers of Congress under the
Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment, which guarantees the right to vote
regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 134 The Voting Rights Act
allowed Department of Justice officials to preclude the use of literacy tests in certain
jurisdictions and required those jurisdictions to "preclear," with the Department of
Justice, any changes in their voting rules. 135 Any jurisdictions in which certain devices
had been used to limit the franchise and in which less than fifty percent of voting age
values); Timothy Egan, Unlikely Alliances Attack Property Rights Measures, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at
Al; John H. Cushman, Jr., The 104th Congress: Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A19.
126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See, e.g., Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440 § 101, 94 Star.
1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat.
3697 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, 82 Stat. 197 (superseded); see Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at
205-06 & nn.53-57.
127. 1 TRIBE, supra note 8, § 5-16, at 946.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179
(1980). This is most evident in the doctrine that Section 5 authorizes Congress to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976); accord Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80 (2000).
130. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468; City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179.
131. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468.
132. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
133. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in various sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
134. 383 U.S. at 337. The Act provided that the Attorney General could suspend literacy tests and similar
state-imposed voting qualifications for five years from the last occurrence of voting discrimination. Voting
Rights Act § 4(a). The Act also established a pre-clearance requirement in certain jurisdictions in which voter
registration was particularly low, suspending all new voting regulations until federal authorities determined
that their use would not perpetuate voting discrimination. Id. § 13.
135. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16.
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residents had registered to vote were subject to such restrictions. 136  The Court
explained that Congress' legislative power pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause extended beyond merely generally forbidding violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 137 Moreover, Congress need not leave it to the judicial process
to fashion particular remedies for systematic constitutional violations or apply such
extraordinary remedies only to particularly problematic political jurisdictions. 138 The
Court noted that Congress had reasonably found that case-by-case adjudication had not
eliminated state violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. 139  The Supreme Court's
holding, prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that state reliance on
literacy tests did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment per se, 14 0 did not preclude
Congress from banning the use of such tests in particular jurisdictions. 14 1  The
legislative record showed that in most but not all jurisdictions in which the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 suspended literacy tests, the tests had been instituted, constructed,
and administered in a disparate fashion to disenfranchise African- Americans. 
142
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 143 the Court upheld Congress' invocation of Section 5
as its source of authority to enact a statute requiring states to allow citizens educated in
Spanish-language elementary schools (basically schools in Puerto Rico) to vote. 144 The
Court recognized that its limitations in defining the scope of rights in adjudicating
constitutional cases were uniquely judicial and that the scope of constitutional rights
might be greater than those judicially declared. 145 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 146 the Court
upheld a statute giving eighteen-year-olds the right to vote, despite its own precedent
suggesting that the Fifteenth Amendment permitted states latitude in determining the
minimum voting age. 147
The Rehnquist Court asserted judicial preeminence with regard to constitutional
interpretation and showed increased solicitude toward federalism. With regard to the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the nascent doctrines being
developed in some earlier cases have been limited in City of Boerne v. Flores, Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, United
136. Id. at 317.
137. Id. at 325-26.
138. Id. at 327. The Court explained that: "[o]n the rare occasions when the Court has found an
unconstitutional exercise of these powers, in its opinion Congress had attacked evils not comprehended by the
Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 326.
139. Id. at 328.
140. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
141. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333-34.
142. Id. at 333-34.
143. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
144. Id. at 646-47.
145. Id. at 648-49.
146. 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970).
147. Id. Interestingly, during this time period, Congress enacted the Highway Beautification Act, which
required state and local governments to pay compensation to the owners of outdoor billboards when the state
or locality enacted regulations that required removal of a billboard. The Act imposed a requirement of
compensation even though under then-extant judicial doctrine, promulgating a regulation requiring removal of
a billboard would almost certainly not constitute a regulatory taking. A federal district court upheld the
statute in Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 614 (D. Vt. 1974). Of course, this controversy arose before




States v. Morrison, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Dickerson v. United States, and
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. 148 Those cases suggest that
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to enforce, but not alter, the
constitutional standards the Court establishes 149  Thus, in City of Boerne, the Court
invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because the Act gave
individuals greater rights against state and local regulation than the Court had
previously held constitutionally necessary. 15  Likewise, in Morrison, the Court
invalidated the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which gave a cause of action to
victims of gender-motivated violence, concluding that VAWA lay beyond Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment power to ensure women the "equal protection of the laws." 
15 1
In Dickerson, the Court held invalid congressional legislation providing for the
admissibility of criminal confessions as inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona. 152 The
Court declared the statute invalid, even though the Miranda Court adopted the warnings
as one of a number of potentially acceptable prophylactic rules designed to protect the
Fifth Amendment rights of criminal defendants. 153  (Indeed, the Miranda Court had
invited Congress to consider alternative approaches to safeguarding those rights.)1
54
The Court has crafted "congruence" and "proportionality" tests to limit Congress'
exercise of its Section 5 powers. 155  The Court demands "congruence" between the
remedial measures Congress has adopted and the constitutional violations Congress
seeks to address. 156 The constraints imposed on the states must be "proportional," that
is, sufficiently tailored to qualify as a response to constitutional violations rather than an
attempt to redefine judicially-declared constitutional rights. 157 Narrow majorities have
sometimes found statutes congruent and proportional, as in Nevada Department of
148. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-81 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 445 (2000) (statutory
provision specifying admissibility of confessions found "voluntary" regardless of whether Miranda warnings
had been given); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (Americans with
Disabilities Act).
149. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 536.
150. Id. at 532-33. Congress enacted the RFRA in direct response to Employment Dn. Dep. of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990), in which the Court had overturned Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16.
151. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619.
152. Id. at 444; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
153. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 n.5 (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993)).
154. Id. (citing Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691). Like the statute at issue in City of Boerne, however, the statute
challenged in Dickerson was little more than an effort to reverse a constitutional ruling of the Court. In
particular, the statute merely reestablished the voluntariness test for admissibility of confessions that existed
before Miranda. Id. at 442-43; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 506-08 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963). Moreover, the statute in Dickerson did not provide any
efficacious alternative to the Miranda warning that would ensure that statements made during custodial
interrogation were voluntary. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
155. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
156. Id. at 530.
157. SeeKimel, 528 U.S. at 80-89; Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531-33 (2004); Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-74 (2001); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-89 (2000); Fl.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-40, 647-48 (1999).
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Human Resources v. Hibbs158 and Tennessee v. Lane. 159 Generally, the dissenters in
such cases that have insisted upon quite rigorous proof of "congruence" and
"proportionality," for example, demanding systematic proof of intentional
unconstitutional discrimination. 
160
Thus, any congressional attempt to overrule Kelo would not likely succeed. It
seems clear that the Court would invalidate a statute precluding economic development
projects from ever qualifying as a "public uses." This would, in effect, change the right
Congress purports to protect. 16 1  However, a more focused approach designed to
address specific abuses of the eminent domain power in the service of economic
development may well lie within Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. The Comparative Role of Congress and the Courts
The Court often cannot construct a rule that is perfectly coterminous with the scope
of a constitutional right. 162 Sometimes, perhaps controversially, the Court will specify
a prophylactic rule that sweeps more broadly than the constitutional right.
163
Sometimes the Court concludes, for institutional reasons, that it cannot judicially
enforce a constitutional provision. 164 At yet other times, however, the Court specifies
procedures designed to ensure that politically accountable decision makers adequately
take constitutional considerations into account. 165 For example, the Court has refused
to hold that the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses immunize media entities from
taxation; 166 however, the Court requires that any taxes imposed on media entities be
158. 538 U.S. 721, 723 (2003) (five Justice majority opinion).
159. Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (five Justice majority opinion).
160. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 745-54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
161. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. The various federalism doctrines, other than sovereign
immunity, protect localities as well as states. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 931 n.15 (1997); see also Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20 (1976); TRIBE, supra note 8, at 917-919.
162. Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 202-04 (collecting sources). Indeed, rles are
inherently either over-inclusive or under-inclusive in relation to their purposes. See Bernard W. Bell, Dead
Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV.
189, 199-200 (1999) [hereinafter Bell, Dead Again]. Only an ad hoc standard can be coterminous with the
constitutional interests it protects; such standards, unfortunately, almost invariably produce unpredictable and
inconsistent results. Id. at 200-201; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 62 (1992). Moreover, because the Supreme Court takes so few cases, it has difficulty policing the
lower courts' application of ad hoc standards. See generally Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987) (discussing implication of the Court's limited docket on substantive doctrines
involving judicial review of agency decisions).
163. Brief for the United States at 44-47, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525),
2000 WL 141075. Scalia's dissent took issue with this approach, at least when the Court applied its
prophylactic rules to states. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 457-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 202-04 (collecting sources). See generally Michael
W. McConnell, Comment, Institution and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, IIl HARV.
L. REV. 153 (1997).
165. Indeed, the Court has largely embraced such an approach in its equal protection jurisprudence, as
captured by the first prong of the Carolene Products approach. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980); Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 217-20.
166. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1991).
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generally applicable to business entities or the citizenry as a whole.167 The Court has
justified this non-discrimination rule, at least in part, as a means to ensure that the
political branches of government, primarily at the state and local level, do not infringe
upon press rights, absent some substantial justification. 168
The Court has also outlined procedures for government institutions, even local
government institutions, that it considers particularly suspect. Consider the restrictions
the Supreme Court has imposed upon state and local censorship of obscenity. In
Freedman v. Maryland, the Court outlined concerns about censors' lack of
objectivity. 169  Such censors might err on the side of prohibiting constitutionally
protected speech in order to justify their existence. 170 Moreover, if the state or locality
makes securing judicial review unduly onerous, a censor's decision might in practical
effect be final. 17 1 In light of these structural concerns, the Court designed requirements
that local censorship regimes had to satisfy. 
172
Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong provides another example of judicial use of structural
protections where the Justices could not, for institutional reasons, engage in rigorous
substantive review. 173 In Hampton, the Court specified that certain decisions rife with
constitutional implications be made at the highest levels of government to ensure that
officials sensitive to the constitutional interests made those decisions. 174 The Court
held that a Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens from federal
employment violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. 175 The Court
acknowledged the government's broad powers over immigration, and the concomitant176 adntdta h ii evc
limited judicial review of constraints on aliens, and noted that the Civil Service
Commission had presented justifications that could support such a rule. 177 Ordinarily,
then, under a "rational basis" analysis, the Court would have upheld the regulation. 178
However, the Court concluded that only the President or Congress could invoke the
interests used to justify the regulation-since the aliens had been admitted into the
167. Id. at 446.
168. Id. at 445-46; Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
As the Court explained in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, "[w]hen the State singles out the press ... the political
constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and
the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." Id. at 585. Note that the Court does not limit singling out the
press or some elements of the press for especially favorable treatment. Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and
the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public Libraries' Use of Internet Flitering Software, 53 FED.
COMMUN. L.J. 191, 227-28 (2001).
169. 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965) ("Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that
he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the
constitutionally protected interests in free expression.").
170. Id. at 57.
171. Id. at 59.
172. Id. at 58-59. In particular, under Freedman, any system of prior restraints must: 1) afford a prompt
hearing to the person whose communication is at issue, 2) require the state to shoulder the burden of showing
that the material is obscene, 3) defer the imposition of a valid final restraint on the material until a judicial
proceeding is commenced and completed, and 4) require the state to seek affirmation of its initial finding of
obscenity. See id.
173. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
174. Id. at 116.
175. Id. at 103; Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 217-19.
176. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 100-02.
177. Id. at 103-04.
178. Id. at 116.
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country pursuant to congressional and presidential decisions, due process required that
decisions to deprive such aliens of an important liberty interest, i.e., working for the
federal government, be made at a comparable level of government. 1
79
Congress can undoubtedly conclude that political safeguards do not adequately
protect state prerogatives or individual rights from federal encroachment and enhance
those safeguards. For instance, Congress has acted on such a conclusion with regard to
its own procedures, as the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 demonstrates.
180
Congress should also possess the authority to assess whether political safeguards fail to
adequately prevent state and local governments from encroaching upon citizens' federal
constitutional rights and take action if it judges those safeguards inadequate. Indeed,
federalism, like the separation of powers, creates a tension between governmental actors
that protects individual liberty. 181 While contemporary scholars and jurists have almost
exclusively focused on the role of the states in protecting individual liberty from federal
encroachment, the reverse is also true. As Alexander Hamilton observed: "[p]ower
being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
ready to check the usurpations of the state governments." ' 182  The Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause plays a critical role in the system of checks and
balances that shape federal-state relations, explicitly empowering Congress to act when
state and local governments jeopardize constitutional rights.
State and local exercise of eminent domain implicates the right to own property, 1
83
including the right to prevent government expropriation of that property for the private
benefit of another. 184  The Kelo majority, and in particular Justice Kennedy,
acknowledged the existence of such a constitutionally-protected right to own
property.
18 5
However, the Court appears unable to vindicate such constitutionally-protected
rights due to institutional concerns. Judges face difficulty in formulating a judicially-
administrable test that does not arrogate to themselves decisions about the role of
government in society and the interrelationship between the public and the private-
179. Id. Alternatively, if the Commission is to impose such a restriction, it must defend it based on
considerations that are properly the concern of the Commission. Id.
180. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
181. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921-22
(1997); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847,
855-57 (1979).
182. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
183. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (right to enjoy property is a personal
right). In his path-breaking article entitled The New Property, Charles Reich argued that a property interest
should be recognized in government licenses, government grants, and government employment because
having a property right in such essentials was crucial to the continued existence of an independent citizenry.
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see id. at 756-60, 768-74 (discussing the
relationship between property and liberty).
184. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain:
Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental
Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661, 663-64 (1989) ("Eminent domain condemnation represents one
of the legal system's most drastic non-penal penal incursions into the rights of individuals"); James W. Ely Jr.,
Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed: Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 17
PROB. & PROP. 31, 31 (2003) ("Eminent domain is one of the most intrusive powers of government. It
requires that individual owners relinquish their property without their consent.").
185. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661; id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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issues that, in a democracy, the political branches of government should resolve.
186
The Kelo majority and Justice Kennedy agreed that the government cannot take
property from one citizen and transfer it to another solely to advantage that other187
person, but how is the Court to enforce this limitation? The Court has three options:
impose its conception of the legitimate ends of government on state and local officials,
review local government decision-making to identify the presence of an illicit private
purpose, or place somewhat arbitrary limits on the government's power to invoke
eminent domain.
The first option is problematic and promises a return to Lochner Era
jurisprudence. 188 Public use, if defined in terms of the benefits sought, rather than the
types of uses to which the property is put, requires a court to categorize governmental
purposes as "public" or "private" in a context where public and private interests are
inextricably intertwined. 189  Indeed, to the extent that interest group theory has
succeeded in convincing us that polities really consist of interest groups competing to
secure government action, 190 we might question whether any significant public interest• • •191
exists independent of private interests. For example, even when a government action
is meant to benefit specific individuals, one might easily view the action as providing a
public benefit. 192  Efforts to distinguish public and private benefits for purposes of
constitutional analysis have led courts, on both the federal and state level, to invalidate
salutary social programs on grounds that they serve a "private" purpose.193 In eminent
186. William Treanor argues that the Just Compensation requirement itself was a procedural protection
designed to constrain government choice in exercising its power of eminent domain. See generally Treanor,
supra note 125. Saul Levmore has also noted the structural function of requiring just compensation-
moreover, in his view, the requirement is primarily designed to protect individuals, rather than more
organized groups (such as corporations or organized interest groups). See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation
and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-08 (1990).
187. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661; id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
188. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner reflected an expanded conception of the Due
Process Clause, which had grown beyond procedural origins to become "a substantive impediment to the
exercise of state and national regulatory authority." Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Equal Protection: Its
Diverse Guises and Effects, 66 ALB. L. REV. 599, 601 (2003).
189. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
190. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 232 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984). See also
Peter H. Schuck, Against (and For) Madison. An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553,
556-57 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1695, 1698 (1989).
191. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 837.
192. Even in one of the few cases in which a federal court has found the public purpose used to justify a
taking pretextual, the local officials made a plausible argument that they were seeking to help a private
business for the benefit of the local community. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129-30 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Local officials asserted that if they did not condemn
plaintiffs' property to transfer it to Costco, Costco would relocate and the surrounding businesses would fail,
ultimately resulting in the area becoming blighted. Id. at 1129. The Court was able to reject the argument on
a statutory ground, that the California Constitution did not permit condemnation to forestall prospective
blight. Id. at 1129-31.
The private necessity defense reflects the judgment that a benefit to a private party can be viewed as
a sufficiently "public" benefit to override private property rights. The defense allows a private citizen to use
private property to avoid physical injury, even if that use causes significant property damage. See Ploof v.
Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 1910);
see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (2000).
193. For examples of situations where courts have invalidated salutary social programs on private purpose
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domain in particular, the efforts of state courts to develop a concise definition of "public
use" that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible takings has hardly been
194
a success.
The second option, which the Kelo majority appears to have chosen, focuses on
public officials' subjective motives and illicit public purposes.195 Justice O'Connor's
accusation that both the majority and Justice Kennedy offer the lower courts little
guidance in identifying illicitly-motivated invocations of eminent domain is surely well-
taken. 196 Indeed, motive tests, such as that adopted by the majority, have often proven
anemic and provided citizens with illusory protection against government officials at
best. 197  For example, even though criminal defendants can defend themselves by
alleging discriminatory prosecution, the presence of a motive test in a context where the
government decision maker customarily enjoys a great deal of discretion means that
very few discriminatory prosecution claims succeed. 198 As I suggest below, such tests
confront the courts with numerous difficulties. 
199
The third option is to limit the government's invocation of eminent domain to
preclude use in certain circumstances even if its use furthers the public interest in an
important, or even essential, manner. 200  Thus, Justice Thomas would construe the
"public use" requirement as permitting government acquisition of land only when the
government will retain ownership or when the land, though privately owned, remains
accessible to all citizens. 20 1 This theory has a rich heritage, but most courts have found
grounds, see generally Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874) (invalidating Topeka's issuance of city
bonds to encourage a private company to establish a bridge manufacturing plant in the city); State ex rel.
Walton v. Edmondson, 106 N.E. 41 (Ohio 1914) (invalidating two statutes that expended public funds for the
benefit of the blind); Ferrie v. Sweeney, 72 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1946) (expenditure of public
funds for the operation and maintenance of day care centers); Stanley v. Dep't. of Conservation & Dev., 199
S.E.2d 641 (N.C. 1973) (issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds for private industry use to finance pollution
abatement and control facilities); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE
AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1057-58 & 1063-64 (4th ed. 2005). But see Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d
I (Me. 1983) (rejecting attack on public funds used to create a private ship repair facility).
194. 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.02[l] (noting that several jurisdictions have
concluded that the task is impracticable); Brown v. Gerald, 61 A. 785, 789 (1905) ("The term public use is
difficult of exact definition, and most courts have avoided giving one"); Board of Educ. v. Pace College, 271
N.Y.S.2d 773 (1966) ("The concept of a public use within the context of the condemnation laws is not
susceptible of precise definition"); 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.02[7].
195. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2664, 2664-65. Formidable evidentiary difficulties are
presented by the illicit public purpose test. See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement " Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 284-91 (1987).
196. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, I I I HARV. L. REV. 54, 95
(1997).
198. See N. Douglas Wells, Prosecution as an Administrative System: Some Fairness Concerns, 27 CAP.
U. L. REv. 841, 843 (1990); Race and the Prosecutor's Charging Decision, 101 HARv L. REv. 1520, 1557
(1988); Notes, Constitutional Risks to Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REv.
2098, 2108 (2001); see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 354 (1997) ("Research has
uncovered no cases, however, in which a court has ruled that, on grounds of racial discrimination, a
prosecutor has abused his discretion.").
199. Cf ELY, supra note 165, at 136-45 (finding such tests useful).
200. For example, state constitutions will list certain uses that benefit private parties as permissible, either
by declaring them "public uses" or by allowing use of eminent domain for specified "private" uses. See 2A
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][c].
201. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2679, 2681, 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Some states go so far as to specify in
their constitutions the types of takings that fall within the definition of "public use." 2A NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.03[10][cl.
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it unduly restrictive. 202  Moreover, even this test allows for takings that benefit a
narrow range of private individuals. First, a general right of access that all citizens
possess may mean little if only few have any interest in such access. Second, the power
to charge for access may also limit access to a narrow class as a practical matter; an
expensive marina may nominally be available to all, yet, in reality, benefit only a
narrow segment of the public who have the financial resources and interest to take
advantage of the marina.
Thus, Congress can perhaps play a role in protecting property rights against state
and local governmental use of their eminent domain powers. Skeptics may argue that
allowing Congress to vindicate property rights under authority granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause would expand congressional power over
the states beyond all means of constraint; after all, the limitations the Court imposed on
state legislatures in the name of protecting private property allowed the Court to
severely hamper state regulation in the Lochner era. 203  However, the Court could
distinguish a congressional power to vindicate citizens' rights to title in, and physical
possession of, property from a broader and more dangerous congressional authority to
protect property owners from state and local regulations that limit their use of property.
The distinction between depriving an owner of title or physical dominion over
property and subjecting the property to regulation underlies the Court's jurisprudence-
a physical invasion (much less formal assumption of title) is virtually always a "taking,"
but enacting a regulation rarely constitutes a "taking." 204  As the Loretto Court
explained, a physical taking "is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's
property interests," 20 5  destroying each of the rights associated with property
ownership. 206 Indeed, both the Court and scholars note that this distinction underlays
the Framers' conception of a taking. 207 Several state constitutions suggest the unique
nature of eminent domain by specifying that the courts must determine whether an
202. See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, §§ 7.02[2], 7.02[3].
203. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 150-57, 159-60, 161-62, 165-68
(4th ed. 1960); TRIBE, supra note 8, §§ 8.2-8.4. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE
OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 111-12 (2001).
204. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-30 (1982). As the Court
stated in Loretto: "More recent cases confirm the distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property." Id. at
430; see also id. at 435 (explaining normative attraction of physical appropriation rule). Cf EPSTEIN, supra
note 4, at 93-104; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1101-06 (1993). For a discussion of the
narrow circumstances under which a court may find a regulatory taking, see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2005).
205. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. Though the protection extends beyond physical takings, a landowner's right
to compensation arguably extends only to regulations that courts consider functionally equivalent to
government acquisitions. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279,
304 (1992); Levmore, supra note 186, at 320 ("One might simply say that joined to the core of physical
takings are cases in which the government sought to elevate form over substance in order to avoid
compensating those burdened by its actions."). See generally FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 334-35.
206. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. In Loretto, the Court explained that a physical taking precludes one of the
most treasured rights in the bundle of property rights-the right to exclude. Id. Moreover, the government's
permanent occupation of private property prevents the owner's use of the property and drains his or her right
to transfer the property at any value. Id. at 436.
207. See Treanor, supra note 125, at 791-92; id. at 838-39 (discussing Madison's views); id. at 794-96
(discussing early Supreme Court cases); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 551-52 (1870) ("[The Takings
Clause] has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential
injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power.").
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asserted public use is actually public, without giving any deference to legislative
determinations that the use qualifies as a public use.208
Moreover, there is reason to believe that individual rights need protection in this
sphere. On the most basic level, the large number of economic development takings
might give rise to some skepticism about the legitimacy of the justification for those
takings. In addition, local governments may be particularly likely to abuse their
eminent domain powers. Many argue that local government is more representative than
the national government because local government offers citizens a more active role in
government affairs. 209  Of course, this very majoritarian responsiveness may place
federal constitutionally-based interests in jeopardy. 2 1  More importantly, however,
special financial interests may more often dominate smaller units of government,
whose continued health and presence in the community are critical to the community
and to its tax base; James Madison's writings reflect precisely these sorts of
211concerns.
However, there is particular reason for concern with regard to the undue influence
economic interests have on local decision making pertaining to the use of eminent
domain. In an era of tax aversion and a demand for government services, revenue-
producing businesses may be critical to local political leaders; the revenue that an
invocation of eminent domain for a commercial enterprise provides may hold even
greater significance than the votes of citizens adversely affected. 212 The criticisms of
the use of eminent domain for economic development trace excessive and oppressive
use of the practice to localities' hunger for tax revenues and the undue influence large
commercial enterprises gain as a result.
2 13
Moreover, some takings may occur in circumstances where there is limited
208. See ARIz. CONST. art. 11, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 14; MO. CONST. art. I § 28, WASH CONST. art
1, § 16; see also 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.03[ 11 ][c].
209. See Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 232; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1210-11 (1977) (discussing four advantages of states-greater accuracy, greater protection of liberty,
greater degree of community, and greater diversity of approaches resulting from decentralization); cf Bell,
The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at n.244 (localities closer to problems).
210. Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 123, at 234 & nn.229-231. Indeed, the Court much more
frequently invalidates state and local actions, as opposed to federal statutes, for reflecting illicit purposes. See
id. at 246 & n.317.
211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). See generally Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note
123, at 237-39. Granted the framers of the Constitution rejected Madison's proposal that the national
government be given the power to nullify state enactments, JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 47-48, 51 (1996), a proposal which reflected
Madison's concerns about the vulnerability of small political units to the dangers of "faction." However, the
Fourteenth Amendment could be viewed as establishing the federal government's power to combat
domination of local governments by special interests, at least when such dominance threatens constitutional
rights and interests. See FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 7, 104-07, 328-29, 367 (discussing the problem of
majority faction). See generally Merrill, supra note 1, at 115; Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 853-57 (1983); Treanor,
supra note 125, at 843-44, 867-68; Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra
note 4, at 28-29 ("Local governments are particularly prone to capture by private, politically influential and
economically powerful interests.").
212. See generally BERLINER, supra note 4, at 7.
213. Id. at 130 (casinos are big winners in condemnation because they bring the prospect of so much tax
revenue); KOMESAR, supra note 203, at 56-59 (discussing influence of economic interests such as developers
on local land use planning); see also id. at 114-15 (citing sources).
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transparency. 2 14 Sometimes the motives of politically-accountable local officeholders
may be shrouded in secrecy, and other times the entities making decisions are not
accountable to the electorate. 2 15 As one commentator has explained:
The problem is also lack of public accountability. Economic development is carried
out through a set of privatized structures and processes designed primarily, if not
exclusively, to meet the needs of business elites and encourage capital investment in
particular geographic areas to promote growth and increase in land prices and rents.
That process is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and shielded from public
scrutiny. This is accomplished through elites wielding informal channels of power as
well as quasi-private government entities such as public authorities that operate free
from public scrutiny. 
2 16
The Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed as conferring upon Congress the
legislative authority to vindicate the interest in property protected by the Takings
Clause. As with gender stereotypes that Congress sought to address in the Family and
Medical Leave Act, the illicit conduct targeted here, use of eminent domain to
advantage private parties rather than further public goals, may be too subtle to detect on
a case-by-case basis. The Court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act as
permissible prophylactic legislation securing equal protection of the laws precisely
because detecting certain forms of gender discrimination on a case-by-case basis
presented such difficulties. 217  Analogously, in the context of First Amendment
challenges to campaign finance regulation, the Court has allowed broad prophylactic
legislation regulating campaign contributions because illicit quid pro quo deals between
officeholders, political parties, and contributors are too subtle for case-by-case
identification. 2 18 Indeed, recall that the Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act
because case-by-case adjudication had proven inadequate for the task of protecting
African-Americans' fight to vote. The existence of such congressional authority
nevertheless leaves a significant, and perhaps preeminent, role for the judiciary. The
judiciary must assess the reasonableness of the limitations congressionally-prescribed
214. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996); Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 4, at 29 n.35; Audrey G. McFarlane, Local Economic Development
Incentives in an Era of Globalization: The Exploitation of Decentralization and Mobility, 35 URB. LAW. 305
passim (2003) (discussing that there is little accountability to the general public for such decisions).
215. 75 F.3d 1311; Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 4, at 29
n.35 ("[T]he delegation of the eminent domain power does not end at local governments, who are accountable
to the public in at least some minimal way. The authority is commonly delegated to utilities, redevelopment
agencies and the like"). See generally FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 330-31, 367 (suggesting greater scrutiny
for administrative agencies in part because they are not subject to pluralist interest group pressures).
216. McFarlane, supra note 214, at 314-15.
217. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (upholding statute because
Congress reasonably concluded that gender-based stereotypes regarding the respective familial
responsibilities of men and women "lead to subtle discrimination [by employers] that may be difficult to
detect on a case-by-case basis").
218. In McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the Court said that Congress could be concerned about the
prospect that officeholders would decide issues according to contributors' wishes rather than on the merits or
on their constituents' preferences. Id. at 153. However, the Court noted, such corruption is neither easy to
detect nor easy to criminalize. Id. It upheld a prophylactic rule limiting candidate solicitation of contributions
of money for use by their political parties, explaining that removing "the temptation" provides the best means
of preventing such corruption. Id. at 153.
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prophylactic rules place on state and local use of eminent domain in light of the threat
state and local invocation of eminent domain poses to individual property rights.
Let us consider two types of potential congressional action: modifying the measure
of "just compensation" in economic development cases and specifying certain
presumptions with regard to the validity of officials' invocation of eminent domain.
Modification of the measure of "just compensation" can compensate for the judiciary's
institutional inadequacies as a protector of property rights against invocations of
eminent domain. Such an approach might then diminish the importance of judicial
inquiry into the purposes of takings by creating incentives for public officials and the
citizenry they represent to balance the need for a taking and the true harm that taking
causes.219 Modifying the measure of "just compensation" makes the political branches
of government more sensitive to constitutional considerations, just as the requirement of
generality makes tax officials sensitive to the burden of taxes on media entities. Thus,
state and local officials are less likely to abuse the power of eminent domain because
using eminent domain will become more costly (at least to the extent it is used in
furtherance of economic redevelopment).
Legislation specifying certain presumptions of invalidity for invocations of eminent
domain in particular circumstances could perhaps serve as prophylactic legislation
designed to ensure the rights of property owners protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, Justice Kennedy, in his separate concurrence, suggests that the
Court will need to develop some guidelines, perhaps in the form of rebuttable or
irrebuttable presumptions, 22  if the public use requirement is to serve as a real
constraint on state and local officials. 22 1 Justice Kennedy laid out some concerns, but
suggested that his concerns by no means exhausted the issues.222 Justice Stevens's
majority opinion also suggests that the majority might consider whether the
presumption of regularity is warranted when a taking is not related to a comprehensive
development plan.223
Rebuttable presumptions would more likely pass constitutional muster than
irrebuttable ones. Thus, perhaps Congress can establish rebuttable presumptions that
takings in certain circumstances constitute unlawful takings for private purposes, but
cannot establish irrebuttable presumptions, such as a presumption that no taking for
economic purpose can be found a taking for "public use." 22 4  Indeed, rebuttable
presumptions will probably be less intrusive than prophylactic rules, such as those rules
219. See FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 364.
220. See generally Fallon, supra note 197, at 95 ("In light of history and familiar psychology, however,
some types of actions-as identified either by their contents or their effects--can be seen in the aggregate as
likely to reflect forbidden purposes. When this is so, a sensible doctrinal response is to elevate the applicable
level of scrutiny.").
221. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222. See id. at 2670-71.
223. See id. at 2655-99.
224. Such an approach does not resurrect the discredited irrebuttable presumptions doctrine, which has
now largely been abandoned. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,446 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974); Dep't. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973); see Bell, Dead
Again, supra note 162, at 203-04. While legislative power should ordinarily not be subject to an equal
protection challenge when it chooses to create an irrebuttable, as opposed to a rebuttable, presumption, the
distinction may have relevance when Congress seeks to legislate in ways that limit state exercise of
constitutionally protected sovereign powers.
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the Supreme Court sometimes adopts when case-by-case adjudication fails to safeguard
individual rights. Such prophylactic rules, like the rule regarding custodial
interrogation set forth in Miranda v. Arizona,225 operate in large part as irrebuttable
presumptions, sweeping within them more conduct than that which actually offends the
relevant constitutional interests.
226
Congress might also focus on legislation protecting constitutional rights (other than
the right to property) threatened by state and local use of eminent domain. Two such
independent constitutional interests have been identified in debates regarding the use of
eminent domain for economic development: ensuring the free exercise of religion and
preventing the denial of equal protection to racial groups or other "discrete and insular"
minorities. With regard to the first interest, some have argued that local officials have
incentives to target buildings owned by religious institutions for redevelopment,
because such property is tax-exempt. Local officials allegedly seek to replace religious
institutions with either commercial entities or residential property owners, who will
produce the tax revenue needed to fund government activities. 22 7  The Fourteenth
Amendment should authorize Congress to craft legislation providing focused protection
to tax-exempt religious or other charitable institutions against state and local use of
eminent domain. 228
The Kelo dissenters voiced concern about the disproportionate impact of economic
development projects accomplished by eminent domain on "discrete and insular
minorities." 229 In particular, Justice Thomas discussed at some length the effect of the
Urban Renewal program's displacement of African-American communities. 230 The
destruction of Poletown, an ethnic neighborhood in Detroit, Michigan condemned for
225. See 348 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
226. See Brief for the United States at 44-47, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525)
(outlining several judicially-created prophylactic constitutional rules). Such rules presume that if the criteria
triggering the rule are met, the conduct is unconstitutional. Thus, such rules offer government officials no
opportunity to demonstrate that their actions are consistent with the underlying constitutional concerns, and
thus should be found permissible.
227. GREENHUT, supra note 4, at 160-188; 151 CONG. REC. H5577-H5584 (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) ("I would point out that the property that is probably the most at risk under the Kelo case is
that which belongs to our religious institutions and other organizations that have been granted tax exempt
status pursuant to State law."); Id. at H5585 (statement of Rep. Tiahrt); see David D. Kirkpatrick, Ruling on
Property Seizure Rallies Christian Groups, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2005, at A 13.
228. For an argument for special protection for First Amendment uses, see Shelly Ross Saxer, Eminent
Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 69 Mo. L. REv. 653 (2004). The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000)), may obviate the need for any additional protection for religious institutions.
The Act provides that no government shall impose a land use regulation that substantially burdens religious
practice or a religious institution unless the government establishes a compelling interest for doing so and the
regulation is the least restrictive means for furthering that government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(l).
The subsection applies whenever the activity imposing the burden is federally funded, affects interstate
commerce, or involves individualized assessments of prospective land uses. Id. § 2000cc(a)(2). More
generally, it precludes all governments from imposing or implementing land use regulations in a way that
discriminates against religious institutions or excludes religious institutions from the jurisdiction. Id. §
2000cc(a).
229. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 n.8 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at
2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see BERLINER, supra note 4, at 102 (discussing the effects of
condemnations for private parties in black neighborhoods); 151 CONG. REC. H5577-5581 (statement of Rep.
Frank). Amici curiae, like that for the NAACP, did so as well. See Brief for NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 4, at 3-4.
230. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2687.
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the construction of a General Motors plant, provides another notorious example of the
deleterious effects takings by local authorities can have on racial and ethnic
communities that lack political power. Others have expressed such concerns about the
use of eminent domain for economic development. 23 1 While the dissenters sought to
address these concerns by wholesale prohibition on economic redevelopment, such
concerns could also be addressed by means of heightened review redevelopment efforts
that have a disproportionate effect on racial, ethnic, or other "discrete and insular"
minorities within the community.
232
2. Congruence and Proportionality
Congruence and proportionality depend upon the existence of established
constitutional doctrines that define constitutionally impermissible state and local
actions. 233  Even where such established doctrines exist, Congress will possess very
limited Section 5 power if the established constitutional tests seek primarily to make
government actions immune from meaningful review.
The congruence and proportionality tests seek to distinguish mere harm to a group• • 234
from harm to the group that constitutes a constitutional transgression. For example,
in justifying legislative action, Congress must do more than show that the elderly or the
handicapped have received unfavorable treatment at the hands of state officials;
Congress must show that such unfavorable treatment rises to the level of
constitutionally-prohibited discrimination. 235 Proportionality is then assessed relative
to the manitude of the violations Congress identifies. The established congruence and
proportionality tests provide Congress substantial authority with regard to state and
local actions that harm racial groups, where clear constitutional standards designed to
eliminate consideration of race (at least in ways that harm members of racial minorities)
exist. The congruence and proportionality tests provide much less robust authority for
Congress to attack state classifications subject only to "rational basis" review, a form of
judicial review designed largely to immunize government action from meaningful
constitutional scrutiny (often due to the judiciary's concerns about its own institutional
limitations). 236
The congruence and proportionality tests may fail to provide Congress with
231. See H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 1313, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3083, 109th Cong.
(2005); Nader & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 224-31; 151 CONG. REC. H5483-H5505 (2005) (statement of Rep.
Kennedy); 151 CONG. REC. H5577-5580 (statement of Rep. Frank); GREENHUT, supra note 4, at 113-120.
232. Treanor, supra note 125, at 872-76 (suggesting heightened scrutiny of takings that have a
disproportionate impact on "discrete and insular" minorities); Nader & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 224-31
(proposing strict scrutiny of invocations of eminent domain where economic development takings cause
significant costs that are not reflected in the award ofjust compensation, and the taking primarily uproots the
politically powerless).
233. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("The first step in applying
these now familiar principles [of congruence and proportionality] is to identify with some precision the scope
of the constitutional right at issue.").
234. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35 (unfavorable treatment insufficient, it must be motivated by
religious animus); see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
235. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
236. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (noting that the rational basis test means minimal scrutiny in theory
but none in fact).
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appropriate authority to constrain state conduct when judicial doctrines defining
constitutional violations either have not been established or are in flux. When courts
have not determined the types of conduct that violate the Constitution, it is difficult to
assess any congressional constraints on state and local officials in relation to the state
and local actions courts would recognize as constitutional violations. The Court has not
clearly defined the standard for finding a taking to be for a private, rather than a public,
use (or, at least, the doctrine is now in flux). The Court appears to be working its way
toward distinguishing licit and illicit purposes in the context of state and local
invocations of eminent domain. At this point, several questions remain unanswered, or
at least subject to some doubt.
In considering challenges to state and local officials' power to take property, the
judiciary could adopt an objective analysis (focusing on the effect of the taking), or a
subjective analysis (focusing on the relevant decision-makers' subjective states of
mind). Though many state doctrines defining "public use" seem to focus on the effect
of the taking rather than the subjective motivations of decision makers,237 the Supreme
Court appears to have opted for the subjective approach.
238
Whether the Court continues to embrace a subjective approach or opts for an
objective one, it will have to distinguish "public" purposes from "private" ones, and
determine the degree of public purpose sufficient to satisfy the "public use"
requirement. The Court will have to identify purposes as public or private. For
example, it will have to decide whether providing land to a major local employer to
expand its operations is a "public" or "private" purpose. Assuming that it can do so, the
Court will still need to determine the quantum of public purpose needed to satisfy the
"public use" requirement. In particular, there are at least five major levels of public
purpose from which to choose.
First, the Court could hold that a taking must merely have some public purpose, no
matter how negligible. Second, the Court could adopt a slightly more demanding
standard requiring a substantial public purpose; in other words, not only must the
invocation of eminent domain have a public purpose, but that purpose must be more
than a negligible consideration. Third, the Court could require that the public purpose
be predominant; that is, the public purpose must be the main purpose. Under this third
approach, even if the public purpose is substantial, the taking is impermissible if that
public purpose is not the predominant one. Of course, determining which of two or
237. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969); 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.02[4].
238. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A court
applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear
showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits...
."); see id. at 2661 (Stevens, J). "[T]he City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the
purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party... Nor would the City be allowed to take
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit."
Id. at 2661; see id. at 2675-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting, without protest from Justices Kennedy
and Stevens, that the majority has adopted a motive test). In discussing pretext, the Court might have been
referring to the district court's analysis in 99 Cent Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (commercial property condemned only because Costco asserted that it
would leave the community otherwise; in addition an alternative site was available to Costco and Costco had
made no effort to purchase property that the city sought to condemn on its behalf); see also Armendariz v.
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1996).
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more purposes predominates poses significant problems in close cases (i.e., the cases in
which this standard might produce a different result from the substantial public purpose
requirement). Fourth, the Court could focus on "but for" causation, and require that the
public purpose be so compelling that the project would have been approved even if
decision-makers had ignored any private purpose. In other words, the court would have
to determine whether any private purpose was a "but for" cause of local officials'
decision to invoke eminent domain. 239  Fifth, the Court might adopt the most
demanding standard, that the presence of any private purpose invalidates the taking, no
matter how significant the public purpose.
240
As others have noted, subjective tests are beset by a conceptual difficulty-which
actors's motives are critical? Surely there will be a number of people involved in
proposing the project, from private lobbyists to elected city leaders to civil servants.
Does the illicit motive of any one of them bar the taking? Or must the person with
illicit motives have played a pivotal role; that is, must the person's contribution have
been essential to the decision to proceed with the project? Or are the illicit motives of
even such a critical participant dispositive in light of the proper motivation of other
equally critical participants in the process?
24 1
As we have seen, the congruence and proportionality tests may not perform well,
given the uncertainty of the underlying substantive constitutional doctrines regarding
public use. However, the congruence and proportionality tests may permit a more
relaxed and deferential review of congressional legislation, in the context of
constraining state and local invocations of eminent domain. First, the Court may find
more deferential review of congressional eminent domain legislation appropriate
because any regulation imposed upon the states need not involve abrogation of
sovereign immunity, a particularly critical aspect of state sovereignty. Of course, as
discussed below, the eminent domain power might be considered an equally significant
sovereign prerogative of state government. 242  Second, deferential review of
congressional legislation seeking to restrict takings to those that serve a "public use"
may be appropriate, because such laws will seek to vindicate a fundamental right which
merits heightened scrutiny, rather than an equal treatment right asserted by a non-
suspect group united only by some characteristic, like age or disability.
Since City of Boerne v. Flores, every Enforcement Clause case in which the Court
has applied the congruence and proportionality tests has involved abrogation of state
sovereign immunity, a particularly critical attribute of state sovereignty recognized, at
239. See Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
871 n.22 (1982); Vill. of Arlington Heights v, Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71, n.21 (1977).
240. These options are phrased in terms of a subjective test, but an analogous range of choices exists if the
Court ultimately adopts an objective standard. An objective test might examine who gains from the project-
the government or the community as a whole or, alternatively, a few narrow interests. In focusing on the
actual project advantages, the Court could use any of the five following alternatives as the standard. Must the
project merely produce some public benefit, a substantial public benefit, a predominant public benefit, a
public benefit so strong that the project was justified even without private benefit, or an exclusively public
benefit? See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 2, § 7.03[5][d].
241. Justice Scalia raises these questions in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) and makes a strong case for their intractability. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
242. See infra text accompanying notes 300-314.
2006]
Journal of Legislation
least to some extent, in the Eleventh Amendment. 243 Arguably, Congress' Section 5
power to authorize private claims for money damages against states is far more limited
than its Section 5 regulatory powers over states. Notably, despite constitutionally-
recognized sovereign immunity, the federal government may not only impose
regulatory restrictions upon states, but may also pursue lawsuits against wayward states
to enforce those regulatory restrictions. 244  In short, the Court may provide Congress
greater leeway in constraining state and local use of eminent domain because, unlike
most statutes based on the Section 5 power that have come before the Court since City
of Boerne v. Flores, federal eminent domain legislation would not necessarily abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
The interest that Congress seeks to protect through restrictions upon state and local
takings may affect the rigor with which the Court applies the congruence and
proportionality tests. When Congress seeks to protect rights that the Court itself
protects, in the context of constitutional adjudication, by subjecting government action
to heightened scrutiny, the rigor of the congruence and proportionality tests are
relaxed. 245 In Hibbs, the court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act, explaining
that the congruence and proportionality tests were less demanding because gender
classification received intermediate scrutiny, unlike the classifications in Kimel and
Garrett, classifications subject only to rational basis scrutiny. 246  In Lane, the Court
applied the congruence and proportionality tests with less rigor because the statutory
provisions under review (which ensured the handicapped physical access to courts)
vindicated the right of access to courts, an amalgamation of several fundamental rights
243. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) ("The States . . . retain 'a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty.' . . . They are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations, but retain the
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty .... The generation that designed and adopted our
federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.") (emphasis added); Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751-52, 760, 765, 769 (2002). Of course, the Court has
noted that the Eleventh Amendment does not set forth the full extent of constitutionally protected state
sovereign immunity. Id. at 752-53; Alden, 527 U.S. at 727-29. Note that in most cases, the entity that uses
eminent domain for urban redevelopment is not the state government, but a locality. Constitutionally-based
sovereign immunity does not cover local entities. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
244. Alden, 527 U.S. at 732-33, 754-56; S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. at 752; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the Congress,
acting pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What is involved is
only the question whether the States can be subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal
Government ... but by private persons seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury without the consent
of the State."); TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1379-80; Id. at 1377 ("Might the decisions mean only that some
policies may not be enforced through private lawsuits for damages-hardly a retrograde idea for the Court to
advance?").
245. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
529 (2004).
246. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, noted that although gender
classifications received intermediate scrutiny, they must serve "important governmental objectives" and
"substantially relate" to the achievement of those objectives. Id. at 736. Moreover, any justifications for such
classifications proffered must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, and
preferences of males and females. Given the rational basis scrutiny courts used with respect to classifications
based on age and disability, to invoke Section 5 to address age and disability discrimination, Congress had to
show a "widespread pattern" of irrational reliance on such criteria. Id. at 735; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90. The
showing required to justify federal legislation attacking gender discrimination by states was less demanding
given the heightened scrutiny due gender classifications. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735. However, in Morrison,
which predates Hibbs, the Court overturned VAWA, finding that it failed the congruence and proportionality
tests, even though the statute sought to ensure gender equality. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26.
[Vol. 32:2
Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London
that give rise to heightened constitutional scrutiny.
247
The Court's "rational basis" language in Kelo suggests that a landowner's claim
that his property has been taken for private use receives a level of scrutiny resembling
that applicable to classifications based on age, disability, and poverty. 24 8  But
fundamental rights (like the right to practice religion, the right to speak, and the right to
own property) differ from equal treatment rights. Government classifications that
burden fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny, and this could justify the
more relaxed congruence and proportionality review, as suggested in both Lane and in
Hibbs v. Winn.
However, Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,249 addressed a federal statute remedying state appropriation of
property.250 The State claimed that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 powers in
enacting the statute. 251  The Court found that the statute failed the congruence and
proportionality tests, and did not appear to employ any sort of relaxed scrutiny.
252
Nevertheless, the Florida Prepaid analysis would not govern review of a statute seeking
to limit state and local official's use of eminent domain.
Florida Prepaid involved a federal statute that required states to pay damages to
patent holders whenever the state infringed a patent. 253 A state could unquestionably
acquire the property at issue (namely the right to use the patented technique), if it paid
the owner. 254 The Court concluded that Congress had not established a record of state
disrespect for citizens' right to property sufficient to justify the challenged
legislation. 255  In particular, Congress had not shown that the remedies for patent
infringement under state law failed to ensure that patent owners received compensation
for state infringements of their patents.256 A federal statute seeking to limit the state
and local authority recognized in Kelo would seek to vindicate a different interest: a
property owner's interest in preventing the government from taking his property at all,
even assuming the government were prepared to pay compensation. Thus, the
effectiveness of the state remedies providing for compensation, critical in Florida
Prepaid, would be irrelevant-because they would not vindicate the property owner's
interest in retaining title to his property. Only state remedies that prevented the
government's acquisition of the property against the owner's will, or restored the owner
247. Though Congress was legislating with regard to the disabled, not a suspect classification, it was
legislating to ensure disabled citizens' access to the courts. Access to the courts is a fundamental right, which
encompasses the Due Process and Confrontation Clause rights of criminal defendants to attend the
proceedings against them, the due process rights of civil litigants to access courts to invoke judicial processes,
the Sixth Amendment right that juries comprise a "fair cross section" of the community and thus not exclude
identifiable groups playing major roles in the community, and the First Amendment's guarantee of a public
right of access to criminal proceedings. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23.
248. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (age); Clebume v. Clebume Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (disability); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (poverty).
249. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
250. Id. at 630.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 639.
253. Id. at 630.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 645.
256. Id. at 643-45.
20061
198 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 32:2
to possession, would vindicate such a right.
257
The proportionality test may well leave some significant leeway for congressional
legislation seeking to constrain state and local use of eminent domain. The contrast
between the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), overturned in City of
Boerne v. Flores,258 and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), upheld in
Hibbs,259 is instructive. The RFRA subjected all state and local action to invalidation if
that action "substantially burden[ed]" the exercise of religion, unless the relevant
government body could demonstrate that its action furthered a compelling state interest,
through the least restrictive means. 26  The RFRA's coverage was "universal."'2 6 1 It
applied to all branches of the state government, to all state officials, and to all
individuals acting under color of state law; it restricted the operation of all statutes and
the implementation of statutory or other state law.262 Moreover, the RFRA subjected
such state action to scrutiny that equaled that of the most demanding constitutional
test. 263
The FMLA required employers, including state governments, to allow middle and
lower level employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually to care for
an ill spouse, child, or parent. 2 6 4 The majority found the statute proportional to the
constitutional violations resulting from state and local application of gender stereotypes
regarding men's and women's relative familial responsibilities. 2 6 5  In reaching its
conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had exempted many employees from the
operation of the statute. Employees who had been with their employer for less than one
year, as well as those in high-ranking or sensitive positions, including state elected
officials, their staffs, and appointed policymakers, were not entitled to statutorily-
mandated leave. 2 6 6  Moreover, the FMLA did not require the employer to pay the
employee during such leave, and the twelve-week maximum duration of FMLA-
mandated leave was modest. 267 In short, unlike the RFRA, which broadly applied to
every aspect of a state's operations, the FMLA had been "narrowly targeted at the
faultline between work and family-precisely where [unconstitutional] sex-based
overgeneralization" persists. 268
Some of the potential congressional responses discussed above focus rather
257. Cf Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2005) (discussing the difference between a
claim that an action constitutes a regulatory taking, which assumes the validity of the government action and
merely seeks compensation, and a substantive due process challenge to a government action constraining
property rights, which contests the very validity of the government action).
258. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
259. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
260. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997).
261. Id. at 516.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 534.
264. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724-25 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(c) (2003)).
265. In particular Congress found pervasive a stereotypical assumption that women had familial
responsibilities that took precedence over their occupational duties, while men did not-and that such
stereotypes led to employment discrimination that forced women to assume the role of primary caregivers,
further reenforcing the prevailing stereotypes. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
266. Id. at 739.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 723.
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precisely either on 1) counteracting the pressures that may well lead local officials to
misuse of eminent domain, or 2) seeking to ensure that in certain limited circumstances
states' and localities' decisions to invoke eminent domain become subject to more than
perfunctory scrutiny, scrutiny that surely will not even approach the rigor of the "strict
scrutiny" standard employed in certain equal protection contexts. The more precisely
Congress focuses any eminent domain legislation on real threats that local officials will
either use eminent domain to further private purposes or fail to seriously consider the
limits on their eminent domain powers implicit in the "public use" requirement, the
more likely that the congressional legislation will survive judicial scrutiny. Finally,
while certainly not required, a jurisdiction-specific approach to legislation, like that
which characterizes the Voting Rights Act, may be particularly appropriate. The wide
disparity in both the incidence of economic development takings in various states and
the procedural limitations on the use of eminent domain suggest that the risk of local
officials taking property for private purposes will likely vary quite substantially
depending on the state in which the invocation of eminent domain occurs.
In short, despite the Court's recent federalism rulings, Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment can provide a basis for some efforts to precisely target state and local
abuses of eminent domain.
B. The Commerce Clause
Given the extraordinary breadth of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, the
Clause may have more potential than the Fourteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause
as a constitutional basis for federal legislation restricting local eminent domain
practices. The Commerce Clause's reach, like that of Section 5, is limited by
federalism concerns exemplified by the Tenth Amendment. Prior to United States v.
Lopez,269 the argument that the Commerce Clause provided an adequate basis for
federal legislation restricting the use of eminent domain would have been relatively
uncontroversial. Surely, in the aggregate, the numerous instances in which state and
local officials use eminent domain to acquire real estate and transfer it to business
entities for commercial redevelopment substantially affect the national economy. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison 27 have imposed constraints on the breadth of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. 271 In particular, when Congress seeks to legislate with
regard to intrastate, non-commercial activity, the Commerce Clause may not provide
legislative authority even if the activity has a substantial effect on interstate27227
commerce. Indeed, in Gonzales v. Raich,2 73 the justices primarily responsible for
Lopez suggested a limited definition of the term "commercial activity," which would
269. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
270. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
271. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001).
272. Morrison suggests that statutes including a jurisdictional requirement will more likely be upheld
against Commerce Clause attack. For example, a federal statute could limit restrictions on economic takings
to those that have some nexus with interstate commerce, such as firms doing business in interstate commerce.
529 U.S. at 611-13.
273. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
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leave even more activities beyond the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause powers.274
Even after Lopez and Morrison, however, Congress' power to regulate commercial
activity remains virtually boundless. 
275
Acquisition of property by eminent domain likely qualifies as commercial activity,
and that activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce. The acquisition of real estate would ordinarily constitute commercial
activity. A locality's acquisition of real property by eminent domain does not involve a
market transaction; the acquisition is an exercise of a sovereign power. The Supreme
Court has not yet had to determine whether the exercise of a sovereign prerogative can
be considered commercial activity. Ordinarily, courts distinguish between
governmental and non-governmental activities, and sometimes the courts subject those. . 276
activities to different rules and constitutional constraints. However, there is no
reason to conclude that the exercise of a sovereign power can never be considered
"commercial activity" for purposes of delineating Congress' regulatory powers under
the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, land acquisition by eminent domain is in some sense equivalent to a
market transaction: it accomplishes the same goals as a market transaction, and the
measure of "just compensation" largely seeks to replicate the financial results that
sellers would have obtained, had the property been sold on the market. Certainly, the
exercise of eminent domain does not resemble mere possession of a particular article,
the focus of the challenged statute in Lopez. In Lopez the Court held that regulation of
possession of firearms in the vicinity of a school lay beyond Congress' Commerce
Clause powers.277 Nor does the exercise of eminent domain resemble the commission
of an act of violence, which, in Morrison, the Court found outside VAWA's reach
because the violence in question was not commercial activity. 278 The use of the takings
power is not even like the cultivation and personal consumption of a product, the focus
of the statute challenged in Raich, where three dissenting judges found that the
regulation lay beyond Congress' Commerce Clause powers. 279 Of course, courts are
particularly likely to view the acquisition of real estate by eminent domain as
commercial activity when it is part of a series of transactions resulting in the transfer of
property to private entities for profit-making activities.
Localities' acquisition of land by way of eminent domain has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The acquisition of property by eminent domain might often
involve purely intrastate activity, namely a local government acquiring property from a
local resident. Even apparently wholly intrastate "transactions" between a local
274. Id. at 2224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
275. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57-58 (2003) (summarily reversing Alabama Supreme
Court, finding that a debt-restructuring agreement consummated between an Alabama bank and an Alabama
construction company in Alabama lay within Congress' Commerce Clause powers, because: (1) the
construction company did business in other states; (2) some of the construction company's inventory, on
which the loan was based, was located outside Alabama; and (3) the aggregate effect of loans made lending an
activity that had a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
276. See Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1075-78, 1101-07 (1980).
277. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
278. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
279. Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2238 (2005).
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jurisdiction and an in-state resident might have a significant impact on the market
facing potential out-of-state real estate purchasers, and thus affect the movement of
individuals and businesses into the area from across state lines. More importantly,
though, the acquisition of real estate by eminent domain for redevelopment must be
considered in light of the localities' plans to subsequently transfer the property to a real
estate developer or other commercial entity. Surely, the acquisition of a number of
parcels to create a commercial project that will attract many individuals and possibly
house businesses operating interstate, qualifies as an activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce. Just as surely, real estate development, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on the national economy, even if the residents and customers living,
working, or shopping in the completed economic development project will be in-state
residents. Such activity surely affects large developers and the construction industry
and may significantly impact the real estate market in general.
The power to regulate interstate commerce permits congressional regulation of
local use of eminent domain for two reasons. First, eminent domain serves as a
substitute for a market transaction, and Congress may legislate to ensure that the
differences in the two processes do not result in individual property owners or the real
estate market as a whole suffering harm when eminent domain takes the place of market
transactions. Second, Congress may legitimately seek to address the undue influence
interstate commercial enterprises gain over local government by their ability to play one
tax-strapped locality against another.
280
Congress should have the power to regulate processes that circumvent the market
in real estate, a major national market. 28 1 While eminent domain seeks to approximate
the market valuation of land, it may do so imprecisely, or only at the cost of significant
litigation expenses. Arguably, when the private market can operate adequately and is
not beset by imperfections that distort the market facing private entities seeking to
amass land for major projects, the market should be allowed to operate. 282 Developers
or other major commercial interests should not have the option of enlisting local
authorities to acquire property by eminent domain in such circumstances.
Congress may also act to remedy any unfairness to property owners who
involuntarily become involved in such an alternative process for the purchase and sale
of property, particularly when the entities that will ultimately gain title are interstate
enterprises. 283  As we have seen, the measure of "just compensation" focuses on a
280. Ely, supra note 165, at 31 ("A further source of aggravation is the charge that resort to eminent
domain is frequently initiated by powerful and politically well-connected interests that have the ear of local
officials.").
281. See, e.g., Daniel Gross, As the McMansions Go, So Goes Job Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2005, §
3, at 34; David Leonhardt, Boom in Jobs, Not Just Houses As Real Estate Drives Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2005, at Al. Congress can be concerned not only about the vitality of the market, which may not be
affected if just compensation is provided, but also about the fairness of eminent domain as an alternative to
the real estate market, which may result in developers keeping surplus rather than having to share the surplus
with the existing property owner.
282. Eminent domain is often needed to address market imperfections. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 74-
77.
283. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (observing "[t]he power to regulate commerce is
the power 'to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed' ...[i]t extends not only to those
regulations which aid, foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it") (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824)); accord Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 58 (1911)
2006]
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property's market price and fails to adequately account for the special value of property
to the owner. If property owners could refuse to sell their property unless offered the
price at which they were willing to sell, they could perhaps recover the sentimental
value of the property, or an amount truly sufficient to obtain equivalent
accommodations. When interstate enterprises can secure property by enlisting local
authorities to invoke eminent domain, property owners who have a sentimental
attachment to their property, or who will find it hard to purchase replacement housing,
or who just want to gain some financial compensation for undergoing the rigors of
moving, are left without a remedy. In short, Congress could potentially find that, in
many situations, the use of eminent domain for economic development serves as a
wasteful alternative to market transactions and one that places property owners in a
worse position.
Congress may also act to address the undue influence of developers or major
enterprises on local governments, particularly because many such entities are interstate
in scope. 284 As noted earlier, concern about the susceptibility of local governments to
powerful or dominant local interests has a significant historical pedigree; indeed, it is
reflected in the work of James Madison. The basis of such concerns about private
dominance of local authorities and the potential effect of such dominance on decisions
to exercise eminent domain powers is not merely speculative.
Local governments rely heavily on property taxes and commercial taxes and often
find their revenues insufficient to satisfy their constituents' demands for government
services. Local governments may find themselves in economic difficulty and also find
themselves competing with other financially-strapped localities (both in-state and out-
of-state) to entice businesses that will locate plants, offices, or other lucrative facilities
within their jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the inducements localities use in this
competition is a willingness to use eminent domain or threaten property owners with the
prospect of eminent domain, to assist a business in assembling parcels of sufficient size
to suit its needs. 285 The competition between cities has become so intense that at least
one scholar has characterized it as "a second Civil War."' 2 8 6  The Commerce Clause
surely confers upon Congress the power to counteract the untoward effects of such
(Congress can prevent commerce in adulterated articles and thus the Food and Drug Act provisions subjecting
adulterated products to confiscation lay within Congress' Commerce clause powers); Champion v. Ames (The
Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 354-56 (1903) (Congress may prohibit commerce in lottery tickets because of
the effect of such commerce on public morals).
284. Part of this concern is evident in the campaign finance cases; in such cases, courts have allowed
federal and state governments to place special restrictions on corporate donors, in part because of such
entities' enhanced capacity to accumulate wealth threatens to overwhelm the political process. See FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-58 (1986); FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 204, 208-10 (1982); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415-16 (1972).
While the First Amendment may limit the states or the federal government power to combat corporate
dominance by restricting corporate speech, Congress presumably possesses broad authority to use its
Commerce Clause power to prevent interstate enterprises from dominating local governments in other
respects. First National Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
285. Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URB. LAW. 193, 193 (1987)
(identifying use or threatened use of eminent domain to assist assemblage as one of eleven types of incentives
states and localities offer to businesses to encourage relocation to their jurisdictions).
286. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377, 378 (1996) (describing competition as "a second Civil
War").
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competition, including the undue influence that interstate businesses consequently gain
over local officials making land use decisions. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already
held that Congress may legislate to protect states from being drawn into a "race to the
bottom," offering more lenient regulation than their neighbors to lure business- .287
enterprises into their jurisdiction. Congress can surely address such tendencies when
localities wield their eminent domain powers to displace citizens in an effort to remain
competitive in attracting businesses.
288
In addition, there is a legitimate concern about the potential financial influence on
officials who make decisions to invoke eminent domain. In particular, legal political
contributions or illegal pay-offs from developers or other commercial interests may
influence local officials' decisions to displace property owners in order to make way for
another private entity. 289 Congress may surely take steps to minimize the risk that the
eminent domain process, which serves as a substitute for market transactions, will
become subject to such corrupt influences.
Congress presumably has the power to enact legislation focusing more precisely on
condemnations related to interstate commerce (such as condemnations involving sports
teams). Thus, for example, Congress could enact a statute prohibiting a locality from
acquiring a team by eminent domain 29 or using eminent domain to provide land for the
owner of professional sports teams to build a stadium.29 1  Alternatively, Congress
might legislate to protect small businesses as an essential component of the economy.
For instance, some commentators argue that use of eminent domain for economic
development has particularly detrimental effects on small businesses. 292  Congress
might find such impacts especially disturbing given that small businesses create
287. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981); Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992) ("The presence of interstate externalities is a
powerful reason for intervention at the federal level .... ).
288. At least one author has suggested federal legislation to constrain competition for corporate sitings.
Steven R. Little, Comment, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Constraints on State
Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 849, 850 (1999).
289. See, e.g., Laura Mansnerus, Eminent Domain 's Pre-Eminence: It's Easiest in a State Where Building
and Politics Intersect, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, § 14, at 1; John P. Martin, Marlboro Official Admits Graft:
Ex-Councilman is Latest Monmouth County Corruption Case, STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), July 8, 2005, at
23; Steve Chambers & Jeff Whelan, Politicians Take Up Land Fight: Corzine and Forrester Condemn
Eminent Domain Abuse, STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), July 15, 2005, at 19 (use of eminent domain "has
become more controversial in recent years as government began handing the seized property over to private
developers, often ones who had made large campaign contributions"); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hudson County
Waterfront Developer Joseph Barry and Janiszewski "Consultant" Indicted, Taken Into Custody,
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/publicaffairs/ NJPress/files/barrl 015_r.htm.
290. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 845 (Cal. 1982); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Baltimore Football Club Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278, 283-84 (D. Md. 1985).
291. See 151 CONG. REc. H5577-H5581 (2005) (statement of Rep. Frank) (arguing against use of eminent
domain to build sports stadiums); BERLINER, supra note 4, at 95-97 (discussing several efforts to use eminent
domain to acquire land for professional baseball stadiums in Massachusetts); GREENHUT, supra note 4, at
202-13.
292. Brief of Amici Curiae America's Future Inc. and Somerset Transmission & Repair Center in Support
of Petitioners at 11-15, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2004 WL
2750340. In one noted case, 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2001), a large chain sought to displace a small business with the help of local
authorities using the power of eminent domain. See Steve Chambers, Eminent Economics: Critics Question
the Effects of Lower Wages Caused By Municipalities Seizing and Redeveloping Land, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, NJ), Aug. 28, 2005, at Business 1.
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between sixty and eighty percent of all new jobs in the country and employ at least half
of all private sector workers, while also acting as particularly critical supporters of
social and charitable activities that improve the quality of life in small communities.
293
Indeed, one theme underlying the congressional criticism of Kelo is a concern about the
effect of eminent domain on small businesses in areas targeted for economic
revitalization. 
294
However, unlike the federal statutes challenged in many of the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause cases, statutes restricting localities' use of eminent domain would
limit a sovereign prerogative of the state: the ability to acquire land by eminent
domain.2 95 The Court might view such a limitation on a sovereign prerogative as
raising significant Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause concerns. 296  Indeed,
Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 297 as well as
Kelo, suggest particular solicitude to local land use management. Moreover, the Court
has shown particular solicitude to states when federal authorities intrude upon areas in
which state and local authorities have traditionally assumed a preeminent role. 298 The
Court has already recognized land use regulation as one such area.
29 9
Like sovereign immunity, the power of eminent domain may be such an inherent
attribute of sovereignty that Congress, even acting pursuant to its enumerated powers,
cannot significantly diminish it. Accordingly, just as the Court has carefully protected
the states' sovereign immunity and viewed recognition of state sovereign immunity as
an essential expression of respect for the states as independent sovereigns, the Court
may carefully protect the states' eminent domain powers, and thus subject to heightened
scrutiny any federal legislation that purports to limit that power. The power of eminent
domain, like that of sovereign immunity, has been recognized by courts as an essential
293. Brief of America's Future, supra note 292, at 16-17, 20-21.
294. The title of the House and Senate Bill is the Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private
Property Act (emphasis added). See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. H5577-H5581 (2005) (statement of Rep. Canon)
("This mistaken ruling has already emboldened governments and developers seeking to take property from
home and small business owners and local communities.") (emphasis added); 151 CONG. REC. H5483-H5505
(2005) (statement of Rep. Garrett) ("[l]f a private developer is going to push someone off their land, out of
their house, and destroy that house or small business, then he should foot the bill for any infrastructure that he
is going to build.") (emphasis added).
295. Eminent domain is a sovereign prerogative of state governments, which have generally delegated that
authority to many of their political subdivisions. See generally IA NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra
note 2, §§ 3.03[3], at 3-52 to -53, 3.03[3][a].
296. The Tenth Amendment provides that any powers the Constitution neither delegates to the federal
government nor prohibits states from exercising "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST amend. X. The Guarantee Clause, article IV, section 4, provides that "[tihe United States shall
guarantee to every State in th[e] Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
297. 535 U.S. 302, 334-35 (2002) ("A rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of
property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty
decisionmaking.") (emphasis added); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 (rejecting a rule that government officials must
show "reasonable certainty" the expected public benefit will indeed come about, because such a rule would
create a significant and unwarranted impediment to comprehensive redevelopment efforts).
298. For example, Morrison suggests that the federal government's ability to impinge upon the states'
police powers is limited even when it legislates under the Commerce Clause. In invalidating the Violence
Against Women Act, the Court pointedly noted that punishing crime is a quintessential aspect of the local
police power. The Court cited family law another area of traditional state regulation. 529 U.S. at 615-16.
299. See, e.g., Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174 (refusing to construe a statute to impinge upon "the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use"); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S.
30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.").
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attribute of sovereignty. And like sovereign immunity, the power of eminent domain
has an impressive historical pedigree.
The U.S. Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the state courts have long
considered the power of eminent domain an inherent and essential attribute of
sovereignty. The Supreme Court has held that "the power of eminent domain is an
attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every independent state." 300  A government's
power of eminent domain does not require recognition in any constitution, but exists in
absolute and unlimited form at the sovereign's inception. 30 1  Indeed, constitutional
provisions relating to eminent domain neither directly nor impliedly grant the power of
eminent domain, but simply serve as limitations upon a power that exists independent of
a constitution and would otherwise be unlimited. 30 2 In these respects, eminent domain
resembles sovereign immunity. 30 3 "The taking of private property for public use upon
just compensation is so often necessary for the proper performance of governmental
functions that the power is deemed to be essential to the life of the state." 3 04 "It cannot
be surrendered, and, if attempted to be contracted away, it may be resumed at will."
30 5
The power of eminent domain "extends to all property within the jurisdiction of the
state."
, 306
The historical claim for eminent domain as an inherent aspect of sovereignty is also
strong. Sovereigns' power to acquire property within their jurisdictions has its origins
in ancient Greece and Rome. 30 7 The term "eminent domain" as a description of the
sovereign power to take property derives from the Latin phrase dominium eminens,
attributable to Seventeenth Century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. 308 The power was well-
established in England at the founding of the colonies, and the colonies frequently
invoked it.3 0 9  In colonial practice, eminent domain was sometimes used for private
purposes, such as creating private ways or mills. Indeed, there was no absolute right to
compensation, although the need to compensate was often recognized as an
300. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, §
1. 14[2] (Julius L. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2002) ("[T]he power [of eminent domain] comes into being eo instante
with the establishment of the government and continues as long as the government endures."); see Kohl v.
United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875).
301. Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1900) (counsel concession); I NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 300, § 1.1412].
302. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 300, § 1.14[2]; id. § 1.14[4] (explaining that it was
inherent in the powers of the colonies and the Northwest Territories).
303. Also, eminent domain, like sovereign immunity, has fiscal implications for state governments,
particularly if Congress alters the measure of "just compensation" to make the exercise of eminent domain
more expensive.
304. Georgia, 264 U.S. at 480. Sovereign power to exercise eminent domain "is essential to a sovereign
government." United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946); Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371-74.
305. Georgia, 264 U.S. at 480; Contributors to Pennsylvania Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23-24
(1917) (upheld acquisition by eminent domain against Contract Clause challenge).
306. Georgia, 264 U.S. at 480 (allowing a state to acquire by eminent domain land owned within its
physical boundaries by a subdivision of another state). Supposedly a legislature cannot revoke its powers of
eminent domain. 1 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 300, at 1-35 n.58 (citing one case). By no
form of contract or legislative grant can the state surrender its right to take property within the limits of the
state when it may be required for the public use. Id. at 1-37 & n.61 (citing cases).
307. Records indicate that the Greeks and Romans took private property for public use. I NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 300, § 1.12[1] (citing ANNALS OF TACITUS, Bk. 1, p. 75).
308. Id. (citing DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS Lib. 111, C.20).
309. Id. §§ 1.21, 1.22.
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obligation. 310 "The power of eminent domain was thus well established in England by
the time of the American Revolution, and the obligation to make compensation had
become a necessary incident to the exercise of the power. ' 3 11 At the commencement of
the Revolution, the powers possessed by the British Parliament devolved to the
governments of the respective states. 
312
Eminent domain might be deemed necessary for acquisition of property for
government ownership or for use by the populace as a whole. But surely, critics of Kelo
would argue, governments have no inherent power or essential need to acquire property
by compulsion to aid private economic development. As a matter of historical practice
and judicial precedent, the power of eminent domain has not been so limited.
Moreover, the power to use eminent domain in aid of economic development might be
seen as critical in terms of local government's taxing powers and ability to raise
sufficient revenue to operate. 3 13  In various contexts, courts have recognized that
government collection of revenue is particularly critical and should be particularly
immune from interference. 3 14  In addition, use of eminent domain for economic
redevelopment may also be essential to a community's ability to continue its own
existence as a viable community. A community requires more than government-owned
buildings, and may even require facilities other than those open solely to the public.
In sum, the Commerce Clause would provide a basis for a statute limiting state and
local eminent domain powers, but a court would also consider the degree of
infringement upon a key attribute of state and local sovereignty.
C. The Spending Clause
The Spending Clause 315 allows Congress to spend money, and Congress may
condition grants-in aid upon the aid recipients' satisfaction of certain requirements.
Congress can impose such limitations not only upon private recipients of federal
310. Id. §§ 1.22[7], [8], [14].
311. Id. §§ 1.13[2], 1.21[5] (citing I BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 139). William Blackstone, with
whom colonists were familiar, discussed the power, though he attributed it to remnants of feudalism. Id.
312. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876). See I NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 300, §
1.23[l]-[2]; ef United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
313. See generally Tracy A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Congressional Limitations on State Tax
Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. LEG. 149, 149 (1998). The Constitution establishes the dual sovereignty of the
states and the federal government. One of the core elements of sovereignty reserved to the states under the
Constitution is the power of a state to define its own tax system. Vital to the states' existence as independent
entities, these taxes enable state governments to perform their various public duties. More eloquently stated,
"[tihe power to tax is the power to govem." Id.; see Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (interpreting the Tax
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341); PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL
TAXATION 4 (1981) (arguing that the power to impose and collect taxes for the support of state government
must not be unduly curtailed); Federal Statutes and Regulations: The Tax Injunction Act, 118 HARv. L. REV.
486 (2004).
314. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 379-81 (1983); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
352 n.18 (1977); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 n.24 (1972); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931). Indeed, as Justice Holmes
famously noted, "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society ...." Compania Gen. de Tabacos v. Collector
of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
315. "The Congress shall have the Power . .. to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and
general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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largess, 3 16 but upon state and municipal recipients of that largess as well. 317  For
example, in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,3 18 the Court upheld application of
the Hatch Act, limiting political activities of civil servants, to state officials whose
employment is financed with federal funds.
3 19
One noted commentator has suggested that "few internal limits exist to constrain"
Congress' spending power, including its power to impose grant limitations. 320 The
Court has not invalidated a grant condition imposed upon states as exceeding Congress'
Spending Clause powers since the 1930s. 32 1 Nevertheless, the Court has pointedly
noted on at least two occasions in recent years that those powers have limits. 322  In
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court explained that a law passed pursuant to the spending
power must meet four requirements. 323 First, the expenditure must further the "general
welfare."' 324 Second, any conditions imposed upon state expenditures of federal funds
must be clearly expressed in the applicable statute, so that states can make a knowing
choice in accepting a grant.325  Third, the grant condition must be related to "'the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs. ' 326 Fourth, because "other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of
federal funds," enforcement of the condition must be consistent with the remainder of
the Constitution. 327 This fourth requirement, however, accords Congress great latitude
in conditioning grants on the grantee's agreement to relinquish constitutional rights or
constitutionally-recognized sovereign prerogatives. Quite apart from the four principles
set forth above, the Court continues to recognize a principle, left over from the 1930's,
that Congress may exceed its spending powers if "the pressure [exerted by a funding
316. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (filters on internet accessible
computer terminals in public libraries); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (abortion counseling);
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (home visits by social service agency caseworkers).
317. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
318. 330 U.S. at 142.
319. Id. at 142-44; see I TRIBE, supra note 8, at 833.
320. 1 TRIBE, supra note 8, § 5-6, at 833; accord Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and
the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1108-09 (1987). The state experience in an analogous context,
seeking to distinguish permissible from impermissible appropriations riders has not been particularly
encouraging. In states that prohibit substantive legislation in appropriations bills, courts have not succeeded
in clearly distinguishing permissible limitations on spending in appropriations bills from impermissible
limitations that constitute substantive legislation. South Dakota Educ. Ass'n v. Barnett, 582 N.W. 2d 386,
391 (S.D. 1998); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So. 2d 153, 158 (La. 1977). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1165-66 (4th ed. 2005).
321. The Court last invalidated a provision as exceeding the spending power in U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936).
322. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13 (1981).
323. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
324. Id. at 207. This does not involve meaningful judicial review of the basis for Congress' conclusion
that the expenditure furthers the general welfare. Id. And indeed the test may not be judicially enforceable at
all. Id. at 207 n.2; accord Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640
(1937); TRIBE, supra note 8, at 837 & n.19.
325. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
326. Indeed, the Court's statement with regard to this requirement was quite tentative: "our cases have
suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated to 'the federal interest in particular national projects or programs." Id. at 207-08. One
commentator has expressed some skepticism concerning the efficacy of such an approach. Kaden, supra note
181, at 894, 896.
327. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 5.6.
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condition] turns into compulsion, and ceases to be an inducement. ' 328 However, the
Court has failed to give much substance to the concept of "coercion" in this context. In
particular, given that federal authorities undoubtedly possess authority to condition
grants-in-aid in ways that will influence state choices, the Court has yet to define the
quantum of financial pressure that constitutes illegitimate coercion rather than
legitimate encouragement.
In New York v. United States,3 2 9 decided several years after South Dakota v. Dole,
the Court expressed its concem about the breadth of Congress' spending power. The
Court observed: "Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not unusual
today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may influence a State's
legislative choices."' 330 Accordingly, the Court noted, the requirement of a relationship
between a funding condition and the program's purpose was critical, else "the spending
power could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal
authority."
' 331
The Spending Clause, and more particularly the scope of Congress' power to
impose conditions on grant recipients, raises issues that have bedeviled courts and
commentators for years in many contexts. 3 3 2  The federal government clearly must
possess the power to direct the expenditure of its money by conditioning provision of its
funds on the recipients' commitment to spending such funds in accordance with federal
wishes. When the federal government chooses to accomplish some goal indirectly by
providing funds to an intermediary who will perform the needed tasks, rather than
directly by performing the tasks itself, the intermediary cannot be free to disregard the
intended scope of the use of the funds.
333
Indeed, while the federal government may not use its regulatory powers to prohibit
private citizens' exercise of their constitutional rights, or states' exercise of their
constitutionally-recognized prerogatives, nothing in the Constitution requires the federal
government to fund the exercise of such rights or prerogatives. Thus, for example, the
federal government may not prohibit women from terminating their pregnancies in
many circumstances or place undue regulatory burdens on such a right,3 3 4 but it need
not financially assist women's efforts to terminate their pregnancies, and may even
328. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211
(1987); Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978); TRIBE, supra note 8, at
840; Kaden, supra note 181, at 893.
329. 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
330. Id.; accord Rosenthal, supra note 321, at 1103-04. Lewis Kaden observed in an influential 1979
article that the most dramatic change in the grant-in-aid system had come from the proliferation of conditions
attached to federal grants, which, taken together, had "altered the shape of the federal system." Kaden, supra
note 181, at 874. He also argued that such conditional grants "often result[ed] in some distortion of state
fiscal decisions." Id. at 882.
331. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
332. In the individual rights sphere, this dilemma is typically discussed as the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L.
REv. 84, 102-04 (1998) (questioning utility of the doctrine).
333. Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("When the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee."); NEA v. Finley,
524 U.S. 569, 612 (1998); see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 196-200 (1991).
334. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992).
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refuse to fund doctors' provision of referrals to women who seek to consider abortion as
an option. 335 Similarly, the Twenty-First Amendment, which commits the regulation of
liquor to the states, may bar the federal government from compelling states to raise their
legal drinking age to twenty-one, 336 but Congress may condition federal highway
funding to states upon state adoption of such an increase in the drinking age.337 Thus,
the federal government can ensure that its funds are spent for their intended
purposes. 338  Even more generally, Congress may ensure that federal funds are not
subject to possible misappropriation or theft by ensuring that grant recipients are
responsible, including, for example, ensuring that state civil servants are not subject to
political pressures that may lead them to make decisions based on improper
considerations. 
339
On the other hand, given the pervasiveness of federal programs, the power to place
conditions on federal funding could serve to undermine individual rights and state
prerogatives if left unlimited. 34  If the federal government may condition funding on
the state or a private citizen refraining from using its own resources to engage in some
activity, the state government or the private citizen may, as a practical matter, lose that
sovereign prerogative or individual right. 341  For example, if Congress withheld all
federal aid to states that do not generally waive their constitutionally-recognized
immunity, 342 state governments would have no choice but to waive that immunity.
Indeed, the risk that federal grant conditions may undermine state sovereign immunity
led the Court to adopt the strong presumption that federal statutes do not condition
funding on state waiver of sovereign immunity. 343 Such conditions show disrespect for
the state as an independent sovereign-they advance federal policies by limiting the
state's ability to use its own funds or exercise its own sovereign prerogatives at the
direction of its citizens. 34 Thus, these two principles (the federal need to control the
use of resources it provides and the importance of private citizens and state sovereigns
retaining their discretion over matters the Constitution commits to them) must be
accommodated.
The various federal interests in controlling the expenditure of federal funds can be
335. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) ("Although the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context
of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all
the advantages of that freedom."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519,
521 (1977).
336. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-206 (1987); id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 206-212.
338. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004); Rust v Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 196-200
(1991); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1971).
339. Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947); see also Sabri v. United States,
541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
340. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); Reich, supra note 183, at 771-77, 779-85.
341. See Kaden, supra note 181, at 870.
342. The Eleventh Amendment protects state sovereign immunity. The court has held that a broader range
of state sovereign immunity is implicit in the constitutional plan. Thus I use the term "Eleventh Amendment
and related" sovereign immunity. See supra note 243.
343. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207
(1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 23 (1981).
344. Such concerns led the Court to adopt the anti-commandeering doctrine. Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 920 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
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grouped into four somewhat distinct categories. 345 The first set of interests can be
characterized as "program definition" interests. Here, Congress imposes restrictions to
ensure that grant recipients spend grant funds for the purposes that the program was
designed to serve, and not for other purposes (even meritorious ones), that Congress
finds less critical, or at least less worthy of funding. 3 4 6 Thus, a government program
for medical assistance may prohibit reimbursement for cosmetic surgery or fertility
treatments, because Congress sought to fund necessary care, and not elective
therapies. 34 7  For example, the governmental interest in Maher v. Roe could be
characterized as program definition-namely, the government may simply have found it
more important to assist the indigent with child birth, and found services for terminating
pregnancy less worthy of funding.
The second category of federal interests served by grant restrictions can be termed
"symbolic" or "dissociative." Here, the federal government seeks to avoid endorsing a
particular practice in which recipients wish to engage, and does so by refusing to allow
the use of federal funds to facilitate that activity. 3 4 8 Congress' concern is not that the
activity harms the operation of the government program, undermines the benefits
provided by the federal program, or interferes with the program's accomplishment of
the government's objectives; rather, Congress simply does not wish to endorse or
facilitate the practice. The regulations implementing Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, at issue in Rust v. Sullivan, 349 provide an example of a funding limitation
embodying a "dissociative" interest. The federal regulation prevented grant recipients
from providing referrals to doctors who offered abortion counseling because the
President's administration disapproved of abortion, not because providing women with
referral to doctors who would discuss the abortion option would harm the program.
Removing the restriction would not have cost the government money, and indeed it
might actually have lowered the cost of the federal program by relieving the federal
government of the expense of providing prenatal services to women who would decide
to exercise their constitutional right to terminate their pregnancies. Nor would the
removal of the restriction have made circumstances more difficult for impoverished
women who wanted to carry their fetus to term.
The third type of federal interest that leads Congress to impose grant restrictions
can be characterized as "functional." Frequently, a government program may not work
effectively unless the federal government can control certain aspects of a grant
recipient's conduct and practices. Such control may be necessary, even if it involves
conditioning grants upon the grantee's relinquishment of constitutionally recognized
rights or sovereign prerogatives. 3 5  For example, in Wyman v. James,3 5 1 plaintiff aid
345. In describing these categories, I will sometimes use cases in which states restrict the use of their
funding, when such limitations provide crisper examples of a particular interest.
346. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
347. Or currently, with regard to Viagra, federal authorities could decide that while alleviating impotency
in older men is perfectly fine goal, such therapy does not merit federal funding given competing budgetary
priorities. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Rejects Coverage of Impotence Pills, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2005,
at A10.
348. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187-88 (1991).
349. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
350. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330
U.S. 127, 143 (1947); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
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recipient challenged the policy of home visits by social service agency caseworkers as a
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.352 Undoubtedly, the Fourth Amendment
would ordinarily bar government officials from entering the plaintiffs home, at least
without a warrant or probable cause. However, the government was entitled to demand
that the plaintiff consent to such visits, despite the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights,
because the government was entitled to determine the manner in which its funds were
being spent and assess the grant program's effectiveness. 353 Similarly, in South Dakota
v. Dole, South Dakota sought to exercise a governmental prerogative, expressly
recognized by the Constitution, to regulate the sale of alcohol within its borders.
However, Congress could condition provision of highway funds on South Dakota
raising its legal drinking age to twenty-one, because of the prospect that eighteen-,
nineteen-, and twenty-year-old drivers who had consumed alcohol to the point of
intoxication might imperil other drivers using the federally funded highways.
354
The fourth type of government interest furthered by grant limitation can be termed
"protective." The government imposes the grant restriction to prevent some harm from
befalling the federal government. For example, Congress may prohibit use of funds for
certain purposes because such funding would make certain issues legitimate matters for
political conflict. FCC v. League of Women Voters355 provides an example of the
Supreme Court's consideration of a law serving this sort of "protective" purpose.356 In
League of Women Voters, non-commercial broadcasters challenged the grant restriction
prohibiting federally aided non-commercial broadcasters from broadcasting editorials.
In enacting the challenged statute, members of Congress had expressed concerns about
government funded propaganda, and feared that the content of government funded
political commentary would become the subject of political contention. In their view,
only private parties, and not the government, should fund the expression of editorial
opinion.
A different type of "protective" interest is exemplified by the Solomon
Amendment. 357  The Solomon Amendment requires educational institutions that
receive federal funding to provide military recruiters the same access to career services
facilities that it provides to recruiters for employers that do not exclude openly-gay
individuals from employment. The Solomon Amendment is a congressional response to
the decisions of educational institutions, most notably law schools, to disassociate
themselves from the military because of the military's exclusion of openly-gay
individuals from military service. The Solomon Amendment clearly seeks to induce
such institutions to interact with the military, despite their opposition to its policies.
351. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
352. Id.
353. Id. at 318-19. The court stated: "The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from
state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has
appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of
that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses." Id.
354. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court found that the expenditure was related because the purpose of
highway grants was to facilitate safe travel. Furthermore, the lack of uniformity in drinking ages led youths to
cross state lines to obtain and consume alcohol. 483 U.S. at 208-09.
355. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 (1984).
356. Id.
357. 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2004).
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The withdrawal of funds is not really directed at the purpose of many of the aid
programs, which seek to provide educational opportunity.
358
My claim focuses upon distinguishing the symbolic and functional federal interests
served by grant conditions. Stricter limits should be imposed on government use of
grant limitations to further symbolic interests than on grant restrictions that serve
functional interests, at least when the grant conditions exert financial pressure on states
(or private citizens) that influence their choices in deciding matters constitutionally
committed to them.
With regard to symbolic interests, Congress has a legitimate interest in refraining
from facilitating state practices, but Congress has no legitimate interest in penalizing
states (or a private citizens) who decide to engage in those practices merely because it
disagrees with the state's (or private citizen's) decision to do so. The federal
government can legitimately express its abhorrence of certain practices by specifying
that its money will not fund such practices. Absent some other enumerated power, like
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause, 359 Congress should
lack the power to penalize states for making decisions that conflict with federal
preferences when the state uses its own resources in accordance with the preferences of
its citizens, as perceived by their elected representatives. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
anti-commandeering cases suggest that the ability of the citizenry of a state, acting
through its elected state officials, to direct the use of that government's general
revenues is a critical attribute of the "republican form of government" guaranteed each
state under the Constitution. 360 Thus, at most the federal government should have the
power only to ensure its own neutrality. 361 In any event, Congress' mere disagreement
with the decisions that states make in the exercise of their prerogatives should not
provide a legitimate basis for imposing grant conditions penalizing states for such
358. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224-28 (3d Cir. 2004)
(discussing the history of the Solomon Amendment and subsequent modifications). The Amendment not only
withholds Defense Department funds to offending institutions, but also funds administered by the
Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education. Id. at 226. The Court
unanimously upheld the Solomon Amendment in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights.
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006). The Court found that the power the Constitution confers on Congress to "provide for
the common Defence," "[t]o raise and support Armies," and "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy" authorized
Congress to mandate that campuses allow military recruiters access, and thus Congress' pursuit of that goal by
imposing a grant condition on federal grants-in-aid to educational institutions was constitutionally
permissible. Id. at 1306.
359. Grant conditions designed to further civil rights, like those challenged in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 478-80 (1980), and Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-569 (1974), fall within Congress' legislative
authority. The Civil War Amendments grant Congress the power to eradicate discrimination by public and
private authorities, and the Spending Clause can be used to carry out any measure that falls within Congress'
other enumerated powers. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478-80; Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see also Kaden, supra note 181, at 895. Thus, were Fullilove's affirmative action holdings still good law,
Congress could clearly impose affirmative action requirements on state and local recipients of federal grants
by conditioning grants-in-aid. In addition, of course, a functional argument could quite possibly be made for
such civil rights requirements. See generally Kaden, supra note 181, at 881.
360. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 5-12, at 909; Merritt, supra note 193, at 23-29; New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 920, 921 (1997) ("A state's government...
[is] accountable to its own citizens."); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1133 (1980) (explaining "market participant"
exception to dormant Commerce Clause as an effort to ensure that states controlled their own funds).
361. To some extent, one may have to define the baseline of entitlement in order to determine what
government action constitutes neutrality. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 18 (1993).
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choices.
362
By contrast, the Spending Clause should be viewed as providing Congress with
broader power to pursue its functional interests in federal spending programs. The
federal government must have the authority to ensure that recipients do not spend
federal grant money in ways that frustrate the goals of a federal spending program, even
if that means conditioning funds on states exercising their sovereign prerogatives in
accordance with federal wishes. South Dakota v. Dole provides a good example of the
importance of this sort of congressional power.363
Congress had a legitimate interest in ensuring that eighteen- to twenty-year olds did
not use the federally funded highway system while drunk and, thereby, endanger other
highway users. Congress could have done so by barring individuals inebriated in this
age range from entering the highway system. While the approach is precisely calibrated
to address the government's interest, it is wildly impractical. Congress could have
sought to protect drivers using federal highways by simply barring this same group,
inebriated or not, from the highway system. Such a less-precisely-tailored solution
would surely have proven somewhat impractical as well (though not as impractical as
the first suggestion). 364 But more importantly, that approach would be unfair-why
should sober eighteen- to twenty-year olds (and, for that matter, sober sixteen- and
seventeen-year olds), be barred from federally funded highways because a
disproportionate percentage of drivers in their age group drive on such highways while
inebriated and cause a disproportionate number of accidents?
Congress chose a practical and fair solution to the danger posed by drunk-driving
teens. However, Congress' chosen solution intruded deeply on constitutionally-
recognized state prerogatives (and on individual liberty, albeit any freedom to consume
alcohol lacks constitutional stature), conditioning government funds on states
prohibiting anyone under twenty-one from drinking, whether they would use the
federally funded highway system, keep to state highways, or refrain from driving at
all. 365 These sorts of decisions about the limitations on states or individuals needed to
accomplish the federal purpose are typically accorded great deference, 366 sometimes
even when individual rights and state prerogatives are at stake. Such congressional
decisions regarding the need for certain statutory provisions to effect federal interests
should receive equal deference in the context of Spending Clause challenges. In the
spending context, as in other contexts, such decisions involve engaging in sensitive
factual inquiries and making difficult predictive judgments. Such inquiries and
362. After the rule is established, Congress will surely, in light of the rule, always seek to provide some
functional argument in favor of the grant limitation.
363. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
364. Presumably, authorities would not enforce the provision by stationing officials at each on-and-off
ramp of interstate highways, but by having officers driving on the highway stop drivers who are not entitled to
use the highway. It is probably easier to spot an underage driver than it is to spot an underage driver who has
had an alcoholic beverage but does not appear to be under the influence of an intoxicant. (If a driver appears
under the influence, no special law would be needed to stop the driver, regardless of his age.).
365. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
366. Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206, 2211-15 (2005) (Commerce Clause); McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 165 (2003) (campaign finance); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66 (1994);
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). More generally, the Necessary and Proper Clause
confers on Congress auxiliary legislative authority to make provisions necessary to accomplish its objectives,
and courts accord Congressional action under the Clause substantial deference.
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assessments are generally considered to lie within the political branches' competence
rather than the courts'. 367
Now contrast the actual South Dakota v. Dole with a hypothetical one. In the
hypothetical case, Congress disapproves of state statutes lowering the legal drinking age
to eighteen because Congress simply disagrees with the state judgment regarding the
appropriate drinking age. Thus, let us assume that Congress justifies its refusal to
provide highway funds to states whose drinking age is eighteen by asserting its desire to
refrain from symbolically endorsing such state decisions. In other words, rather than
serving a functional purpose, the limitation on state authority merely serves a
dissociative purpose. In a sense, federal funding would facilitate drinking in this age
group: if the federal government held firmly to denying federal highway funds to states
whose legal drinking age was lower than twenty-one, the recalcitrant states would relent
and prohibit such eighteen- to twenty-year olds from drinking. 368 Thus, in a sense, the
absence of the federal grant condition would be a necessary, and indeed important,
condition precedent to teen drunk driving. However, in such a case, the federal stance
would hardly be considered a neutral one. Even absent the grant limitation desired by
Congress, federal funds would not actually finance teen drinking, such as they would if
the federal government funded beer distribution that was destined for drinkers not only
older than twenty-one, but younger drinkers as well. Rather, the federal government is
using conditional funding and the prospect of its withdrawal to change the decisions of
state officials with whom it disagrees. The highway program is designed to provide
funds to create safe and useful roads, and in general decisions are intended to be made
on that basis, 369 and that statutory purpose thus provides a baseline for states' legitimate
expectations. Withdrawing such funding because of disagreement with a state policy
can be viewed as coercion, not merely removing encouragement.
Courts have been particularly careful with conditional funding that interferes with
critical powers of coordinate sovereigns, 37 other branches of government, 371 or private
institutions, 372 as well as conditional funding that in practical effect expands a
government's regulatory powers. 373
The concern about undermining critical aspects or powers of coordinate sovereigns
is evident in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.374 The Court has recognized
that states possess a power to choose who they will do business with, and may wield
367. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 38-51 (1977); Cornelius J. Peck, The Role
of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN L. REv. 265, 296-302 (1963). See
generally Stuart M. Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REv. 281, 332-
42 (2000). Professor Benjamin accepts the proposition that legislatures are superior fact-finders, but
ultimately questions whether they are more accomplished predictors of current policies' future consequences.
368. This would constitute facilitation in terms of a type of "but for" test as that used in torts. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft 2001).
369. Federal statute specifies that federal highways are to be designed and constructed in accordance with
criteria suited to accomplish the objectives of providing roadways that "adequately serve the existing and
planned future traffic of the highway in a manner that is conducive to safety, durability, and economy of
maintenance." 23 U.S.C. § 109(a)(1) (2000).
370. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
371. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001).
372. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998).
373. South-Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-92 (1984).
374. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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that power to prefer their own citizens. 375 As the Court has explained, states "may
fairly claim some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how,
with whom, and for whose benefit to deal."' 376 In the 1980s and 1990s many state and
local governments used their procurement discretion to express their disapproval of
foreign governments, first in South Africa and then in many other countries. 377 One of
the countries targeted was Myanmar. In Crosby, the Court invalidated Massachusetts'
policy of precluding its contractors from doing business with the Government of
Myanmar. While the case was narrowly decided on obstacle preemption grounds
(which limits state and local power, but not federal power), the Court observed more
generally that Massachusetts' use of its procurement power interfered with the nation's,
and in particular the President's, power to conduct foreign policy.3 78 Presumably, a
state could decide that it would not do business with a company based in a country
whose regime it abhorred, though even then Congress might have the power to preempt
such a state or local provision.
379
The concern about interfering with other branches of government is evident in
Crosby as well, with a concern not merely about federal prerogatives, but about
Presidential prerogatives and the President's ability to take action with regard to matters
that the Constitution commits to his discretion. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez
provides a second illustration of the Court's concerns about grant conditions that intrude
upon another branch of government.380 In Velazquez, the plaintiffs challenged a federal
statute and implementing regulations that limited entities receiving Legal Services
Corporation grants from accepting representations that would involve challenging the
constitutional or statutory validity of welfare statutes or regulations even if the issue
became apparent after the representation was well underway. Congress can choose to
fund the litigation it considers most important. 381  It cannot, however, use grant
restrictions to limit lawyers who receive grant funds in ways that compromise their
essential function in the judicial system, namely raising all issues presented by a case
that warrant judicial consideration. In resolving cases, judges rely on lawyers to fully
present the relevant arguments, including arguments that government officials have
exceeded their constitutional or statutory authority. Allowing funding that imposes
375. The Court has recognized this expressly in the domestic context. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9, 438 n.10 (1980). There is some debate
among commentators about whether the market participant exception applies at all in the foreign context.
Board of Trustees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752-54 (Md. 1989) (holding that it
does apply but referencing contrary commentary from commentators); Thomas A. Barnico, The Road From
Burma: State Boycotts After Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 19 B.U. INT'L L. J. 89, 107-08 &
nn.142-44 (discussing debate about whether market participant power applies to the Foreign Affairs power);
Wendy L. Wallace, Note, Are States Denied A Voice?: Citizen-Driven Foreign Policy After Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793, 793-95 (examining private market participant
and the dormant foreign commerce clause power and possibly the foreign affairs power). See generally Carol
E. Head, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power: Constitutional Implications for State and Local Investment
Restrictions Impacting Foreign Countries, 42 B.C. L. REV. 123 (2000).
376. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1980).
377. Head, supra note 375, at 123, 127-34.
378. Id. at 376.
379. This was Tribe's approach in the second edition of his Constitutional Law treatise. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-21, at 469 (2d ed. 1988).
380. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
381. Id. at 536.
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such a restriction impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary's domain by interfering
with the proper operation of the judicial system.382 The mere decision to fund certain
cases and not others, however, would not have such an effect-it would merely express
Congress' view that some types of litigation were more essential, or at least more
worthy of funding, given the intense competition for federal funds.
Some cases exhibit judicial concern about grant restrictions that interfere with
private institutions, and in particular their essential functions or attributes. Velazquez
exemplifies this sort of concern as well. Lawyers not only serve a governmental
function, but a private one as well, namely, representing clients. That representation
has essential features, including a duty of loyalty to the client, requiring the lawyer to
put the client's interests above others, even those funding the representation. 383 The
Congressional limitation threatened to compromise that loyalty. The grant restriction
rested on the presumption that the role of legal aid lawyers, at least in part, is to
communicate the government's message. Co-opting an established institution, like
legal representation, to communicate the government message was, the Court found,
constitutionally impermissible. 384 The Court characterized some of its other holdings
in these terms, though it did not necessarily use this theory as a rationale at the time of
those decisions. Thus, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
385
the Court rejected a minor candidate's claim of a First Amendment right to participate
in a debate sponsored by a public television station. Though the station was federally-
funded, and publicly-owned, it retained editorial discretion. Exerting authority over a
broadcast station, even a publicly owned one, to specify the candidates that would
participate in a debate would conflict with the editorial discretion essential for
broadcasters. More particularly, "the dynamics of the broadcasting system gave station
programmers the right to use editorial judgment to exclude certain speech so that the
broadcast message could be more effective."
386
Finally, the concern that grant restriction might facilitate the undue expansion of
the grantors' regulatory power surfaces in the market participant cases. 387 As noted
earlier, the Court has recognized that the Commerce Clause was designed to limit
states' regulatory powers, not their participation in the market. While a state could not
prefer its own citizens by imposing regulation that favored its citizens, 388 it could favor
its citizens in deciding with whom it would deal. 389 It quickly became apparent that
382. Id. at 544 ("The government may not design a subsidy to effect [a] serious and fundamental
restriction on advocacy of attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.").
383. See United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 91, 95-96 (2002).
384. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544. Note, the same argument was made in Rust v. Sullivan and the Court
managed to avoid addressing it. Velazquez may well undermine Rust because arguably Rust also involves
funding limitations that coopt an established institution, namely the doctor-patient relationship.
385. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
386. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543; see also Schauer, supra note 332, at 107-08, 113-18.
387. Granted the market participant doctrine is not merely limited to grants, and indeed primarily takes the
form of expenditures used to purchase goods and services. However, procurement and the award of grants-in
aid are both attributes of the spending power, and both potentially expand a government's regulatory powers.
388. E.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkson, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); accord Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). See generally TRIBE, supra note 8, §
6-6.
389. See generally Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429 (1980).
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states could magnify the effect of wielding their limited market power by not only
requiring that their contract partners be state citizens, but requiring that those contract
partners, in turn, deal exclusively with its citizens.
In South-Central Timber Development Co. v. Wunnicke, the Court stopped this
trend. While the market participant exception allowed states to choose their contracting
partners based on residency, it did not allow states to demand that its contract partners
do the same. In effect, the Court attempted to draw a line between spending and market
participation on the one hand, and regulation on the other.
390
So what is the scope of Congress' spending power in the context of Congress'
impending effort to limit state and local use of eminent domain? If, of course, Congress
can restrict state and local officials' invocation of eminent domain either under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause, it could accomplish the same
result by imposing conditions on grants-in-aid. To the extent that neither Section 5 nor
the Commerce Clause authorize such limitations, Congress' Spending Clause power is
more limited. Congress may clearly prohibit federal funds from being used to pay "just
compensation" for property taken in circumstances that Congress finds abhorrent. Even
assuming that the only federal interest served by such a limitation is a symbolic one,
Congress would merely be precluding states and localities from using federal funds to
acquire property by eminent domain under circumstances in which Congress
disapproves. States and localities would be left entirely free to exercise the power of
eminent domain for economic development consistent with their own policies regarding
the use of eminent domain they would merely be required to use their own funds.
States and localities would suffer no additional penalty for adhering to an eminent
domain policy that differed from that of the federal government. Congress can no doubt
also preclude states from using federal funds to pay for certain tasks that are a part of
the eminent domain process, such as bringing lawsuits to acquire property by eminent
domain.
The approach reflected in the Private Property Protection Act, withdrawing all
federal economic development funding from a state or locality, even funding going to
projects that in no way involve the use of eminent domain, should a state or locality
invoke eminent domain for economic development purposes for any one project, should
be considered impermissible. The House Judiciary Committee sought to provide a
functional justification for withdrawal of all economic funds from states and localities
that use eminent domain for economic development purposes. In particular, the
Committee argued that "[s]tates or localities that have abused their eminent domain
power by using 'economic development' as an improper rationale for a taking should
not be trusted with Federal taxpayer funds for other 'economic development' projects
,,391which could themselves result in abusive takings of private property.
The House Committee clearly sought to rely on cases which provide that Congress
can place conditions on grants-in-aid to ensure that the grant recipients are responsible
partners.392 However, the federal government can clearly prohibit the use of federal
funds for economic development in violation of federal policies by means other than
390. Id. at 98-99; see White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983).
391. Id. at 11.
392. See supra note 315.
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debarring from federal economic development programs states and localities who use
their own funds to exercise eminent domain for economic development in a manner that
the Supreme Court has recognized as falling within traditional state and local authority.
The invocation of eminent domain by state and local officials is very public, and
landowners adversely affected certainly have sufficient interest to bring state and local
use of federal funds for economic development condemnations to the attention of the
federal government.
The only substantial justification for the breadth of the penalty set forth in the
Private Property Protection Act is Congress' disapproval of states and localities using
their own funds to condemn land for economic development purposes. In the Private
Property Protection Act, the House of Representatives goes beyond refusing to allow
federal funds to be used for state and local activities it disapproves of, and seeks to
penalize states and localities for engaging in certain eminent domain practices simply
because it disagrees with those choices. Congress' "symbolic" or "dissociative" interest
should not be sufficient to allow it to use a funding condition to dictate choices that
states and local governments have a right to make.
A more difficult case would be posed by an expansive interpretation of the Garrett-
Kennedy rider or the Gingrey-Comyn proposal, which might require de-funding of
segregable aspects of a redevelopment project because the state or locality used its
power of eminent domain in acquiring land for some aspect of the project. The
rationale underlying such an expansive withdrawal of funding is not entirely clear. If it
is solely symbolic, the analysis above suggests that Congress should lack the power to
withdraw funding merely because it disapproves of the state's decisions to exercise its
powers of eminent domain using state funds. To take the Garret-Kennedy bill
provisions as they might relate to transportation funds as an example, when deciding
whether highway or mass transit funds can be used to provide a means to reach a
particular development (i.e., a transportation link), the use of eminent domain by state
or local officials in acquiring land for the development should be irrelevant.
393
However, Congress should be able to use its Spending Clause power to reach state and
local eminent domain practices used to acquire property needed for the federally-funded
transportation link itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
Members of Congress from across the political spectrum disagree with Kelo v. New
London, and find ample support for their position from an outraged citizenry. But
responding to the decision poses something of a challenge for Congress. Members of
Congress seem somewhat inclined to simply establish the rule endorsed by the dissent
and rejected by the majority: acquisition of land for economic revitalization cannot
393. For instance, federal highway funding is to be provided based on probable future traffic needs and the
safety, durability, and cost of maintenance of the highway. While federal authorities must also consider
impacts on the public and the community, including displacement of people, businesses, or farms, nothing in
the statute suggests that once a locality makes an independent decision to displace others for a project that it
will fund, federal authorities are to treat the location disfavorably in terms of serving existing or probable
future traffic needs, based on any disagreement with the state's exercise of its discretion. See generally
Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive
Approaches to Resolving America 's Major Quality of Life Crisis, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 915, 923-24 (1991).
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qualify as a "public use" that allows state and local authorities the power to use eminent
domain. Congress seeks to establish such a rule not by exercise of its regulatory
authority, but by using federal grant programs as leverage. Whether Congress wishes to
use its regulatory powers or its power of the purse, the assertion of preeminence as a
constitutional interpreter implicit in such an approach will likely lead the Supreme
Court, and indeed the lower federal courts, to invalidate such legislative initiatives. The
above analysis suggests that a more narrowly focused approach to protecting property
owners from appropriation of their land for private use might well be grounded on the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the
Spending Clause.
